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Privatizing Securities Disputes Through
The Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements
C. Edward Fletcher, III*
The judicial attitude toward arbitration clauses in contracts
has been ambivalent throughout history. At least as far back as
the Middle Ages, arbitration was an integral part of the dispute
resolution systems of certain European civilizations, including
that of England.1 Arbitration continues to play a central role in
the resolution of international disputes2 and is part of the offi-
cial dispute resolution systems of some countries.3 In the
United States, arbitration has played a central role in resolving
differences since the inception of the Republic. 4
Notwithstanding this long history of arbitration, at one
time judges showed an open hostility toward agreements to ar-
bitrate, reasoning that such agreements were improper at-
tempts to oust the courts of their rightful jurisdiction.5 Such
* Assistant Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.
1. See, e.g., Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA.
L. REV. 265, 266 (1926) ("The use of arbitration dates back to the earliest days
of which we have historical knowledge. It furnished almost exclusively the
tribunals for the settlement of business disputes in the medieval period, and in
England up to Lord Mansfield's day was practically the sole remedy open to
English merchants."); Miller, Avoiding Legal Judgment7 The Submission of
Disputes to Arbitration in Medieval Iceland, 28 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 95 (1984)
(describing arbitration procedures in Iceland circa A.D. 1000); Powell, Settle-
ment of Disputes by Arbitration in Fifteenth-Century England, 2 LAW & HIST.
REV. 21 (1984) (describing arbitration procedures in medieval England).
2. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 508 (1974)
(describing international contract calling for resolution of disputes by arbitra-
tion before the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris).
3. See, e.g., Macneil, Contract in China: Law, Practice, and Dispute Reso-
lution, 38 STAN. L. REV. 303, 330-31 (1986) (describing arbitration as part of the
official dispute resolution process in the People's Republic of China).
4. See, e.g., 1 THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER-LEGAL PAPERS 322-32
(A. Konofsky & A. King eds. 1982) (describing arbitration and reference prac-
tices in New Hampshire in the early eighteenth century).
5. See, e.g., W.H. Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co., 190 Cal. 665, 667, 214 P. 38, 39
(1923) (discussing origin of rule that arbitration agreements are unenforceable
as attempts to "oust the legally constituted courts of their jurisdiction and set
up private tribunals"); Cocalis v. Nazlides, 308 Ill. 152, 159-60, 139 N.E. 95, 98-99
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jurisdictional jealousy has appeared even in modern times.6 De-
spite historical judicial hostility, parties have continued to arbi-
trate their disputes. Today, given crowded courts and
prohibitive litigation costs, arbitration is an increasingly popu-
lar alternative7 that has received the unqualified endorsement
of former Chief Justice Warren Burger.8
Arbitration is a particularly popular method for resolving
securities disputes. For the year ended March 31, 1984, more
than 3000 securities and commodities cases were filed in federal
district courts.9 During roughly the same period, however, al-
most 2000 securities cases alone were arbitrated under the aus-
pices of the various self-regulatory organizations (SROs).10 This
(1923) (holding that an agreement to submit future disputes or controversies
to arbitration was void in accordance with the common law where an arbitra-
tion statute required an existing controversy), superseded by ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 10, para. 101 (Smith-Hurd 1981 & Supp. 1986) (validating written contracts
to submit future disputes to arbitration) as stated in Grace Ev. Luth. Church
v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 118 Ill. App. 3d 151, 158, 454 N.E.2d 1038,
1043 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984); Gauche v. Metropolitan Bldg. Co.,
125 La. 530, 534-35, 51 So. 578, 579 (1910) (refusing to order specific perform-
ance of a contract which required defendant to appoint a disinterested party to
confer with the plaintiff's appointed disinterested party as to choice of arbitra-
tor); Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 379 (1868) (stating that arbitration stipu-
lations are regarded as against common law policy because they exclude the
courts, which are the proper forums to entertain and decide legal controver-
sies); see also Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510 (stating that the Federal Arbitration Act,
enacted in 1924, reversed centuries of judicial hostility toward arbitration
agreements).
6. See, e.g., Shearson, Hammill & Co. v. Vouis, 247 So. 2d 733, 735 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.) (basing its decision on the proposition that "agreements to arbi-
trate controversies in the future cannot and should not oust the courts of the
jurisdiction conferred on them by organic law"), cert. denied, 253 So. 2d 444
(Fla. 1971).
7. The number of commercial and labor cases arbitrated under the aus-
pices of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), for example, more than
doubled between 1975 and 1985. See Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative,
71 A.B.A. J. 78, 79 (Feb. 1985) (stating that in 1985, nearly 40,000 new commer-
cial, labor, accident, and construction cases were filed with the AAA). Robert
Coulson, president of the AAA, claims that more commercial disputes are now
arbitrated than tried before juries. See id.
8. See Middleton, Burger: Arbitrate More and Litigate Less, 68 A.B.A. J.
257 (Mar. 1982).
9. See Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 279, 279 n.5 (1984).
10. See id. at 280 n.7 (showing that in 1983, 1731 cases were submitted to
various SROs for arbitration). These SROs are the American Stock Exchange,
the New York Stock Exchange, the Boston Stock Exchange, the Midwest
Stock Exchange, the Cincinatti Stock Exchange, the Pacific Stock Exchange,
the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, the Chicago Board Options Exchange, the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, and the National Association of Se-
curities Dealers.
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number does not include the arbitration of securities disputes
before tribunals such as the New York Chamber of Commerce
Arbitration Department or the American Arbitration Associa-
tion."l The number of cases submitted to arbitration before
those SROs has been increasing annually. 12
Nevertheless, the increasing popularity of arbitration of se-
curities disputes does not mean that a contractual arbitration
clause will be enforced over the protestations of the other party
to the contract. The enforceability of contractual arbitration
clauses in securities disputes is a doctrinally complex area of
law that becomes more complex and less clear every time the
United States Supreme Court considers the matter. This Arti-
cle sorts through the doctrinal complexity, which the recent
Supreme Court case of Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd' 3
made worse, and offers recommendations for the future. Part I
examines the interrelationship between the three statutes in-
volved in determining the arbitrability of securities disputes:
the Federal Arbitration Act (the FAA),14 the Securities Act of
1933 (the 1933 Act),' 5 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the 1934 Act).16
Part II presents the development of the case law regarding
the arbitrability of securities disputes, beginning with Wilko v.
Swan,17 through Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,' 8 to the recent
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd.19 Part II demonstrates that
these three cases failed to resolve several troublesome issues
regarding the arbitrability of securities disputes.
Part III examines the maelstrom of controversy engen-
dered by the three cases and the current unsettled state of the
law. As Part III shows, lower courts have continued to disagree
vehemently about where these three cases leave the law on is-
11. As discussed infra notes 355-60 and accompanying text, securities
agreements between brokers and customers, if they include arbitration
clauses, generally give the customer the choice of where she wants to arbi-
trate. Frequently, the AAA and, to a lesser extent, the New York Chamber of
Commerce Arbitration Department are among the options available to the
customer. See id
12. In 1980, 830 cases were submitted for arbitration before those SROs; in
1981, 1,042; in 1982, 1,340; and in 1983, 1,731. See Katsoris, supra note 9, at 280
n.7.
13. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
14. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
16. Id. §§ 78a-78kk.
17. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
18. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
19. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
1987]
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sues of arbitrability. The Supreme Court will resolve certain
aspects of that disagreement soon; the Court has agreed to de-
cide a case that raises some of the most important issues sur-
rounding securities arbitration.
20
Finally, Part IV addresses the larger question of whether
arbitration is an appropriate mechanism for resolving securities
disputes. Part IV contends that myths are largely responsible
for the general antipathy toward the arbitration of securities
claims. The Article then offers guidance for the future, arguing
that once the myths surrounding arbitration practices are dis-
pelled, a clear case exists for allowing parties to avoid the ex-
pense and delay of litigation in favor of arbitration. The Article
concludes by recommending increased judicial tolerance for the
privatization of securities disputes and legislative changes that
would foster that judicial tolerance.
I. THE STATUTORY PRONOUNCEMENTS
A. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
1. Hostility, Costs, and Congestion
The starting point for any analysis of securities arbitration
is, of course, the FAA.21 As noted above, the judiciary was once
openly hostile to contract provisions calling for an arbitral fo-
rum for dispute resolution.2 2 Congress sought to change that
hostility in 1925 by enacting the FAA,2 3 which placed the en-
forceability of such agreements on a par with that of other con-
tracts.24 Congress's main concern in passing the Act was to
enforce the arbitration agreements into which the parties had
20. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986) (No. 86-44); see infra notes 189-92 and accom-
panying text.
21. See Brief For the Securities and Exchange Commission As Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, 8, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. Mc-
Mahon, cert granted 107 S. Ct. 60 (No. 86-44) [hereinafter SEC Amicus Brief].
22. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
23. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)).
24. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924) ("Arbitration
agreements are simply matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply
to make the contracting party live up to his agreement."); see also Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974) (stating that the FAA was "to
place arbitration agreements 'upon the same footing as other contracts' ")
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1924)); The Anaconda v.
American Sugar Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 42, 44 (1944) (stating that the FAA ren-
dered the written contract provision requiring arbitration specifically
enforceable).
Vol. 71:393
SECURITIES ARBITRATION
entered.25 In addition, Congress sought to help parties avoid
the expense and delay of litigation.26 By enacting the FAA,
Congress intended to signal clearly its support of arbitration
over litigation as a means of dispute resolution.27
The FAA accomplishes Congress's two goals by declaring
that in any maritime or interstate commerce transaction,28 a
written provision to arbitrate future disputes arising out of that
transaction is "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract."29 The FAA provides that a federal district court
must stay its proceeding on any issue it determines to be arbi-
trable, pending arbitration, on the motion of any party.30 If the
parties have not selected a means of appointing an arbitrator,
the FAA provides one.31 The FAA also limits the availability
of discovery in the arbitration process 32 and judicial review of
arbitral awards. 33 Finally, the FAA provides a mechanism for
converting the arbitrator's award into a federal court
judgment.34
Courts unanimously recognize that the FAA represents a
"strong national policy favoring the recognition of arbitration
25. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) ("The
legislative history of the Act establishes that the purpose behind its passage
was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately made agreements to
arbitrate.").
26. See, e.g., Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510-11 (FAA designed "to avoid 'the costli-
ness and delays of litigation' ") (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
1, 2 (1924)); Legg, Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1367, 1372
(D.D.C. 1972) ("The basic purpose of the [FAA] is to relieve the parties from
costly litigation and help ease congested court dockets."); Cohen & Dayton,
supra note 1, at 265 (stating that the FAA was motivated by "the unfortunate
congestion of the courts and . . . the delay, expense and technicality of
litigation").
27. See S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924) (discussing Con-
gress's desire to avoid the "expense and delay" of litigation, and emphasizing
the benefits of arbitration).
28. The requirement that the transaction be one in maritime or interstate
commerce is discussed infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
29. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
30. I& § 3.
31. Id. § 5.
32. See id § 7 (providing the arbitrator with subpoena power). The
problems of limited arbitral discovery are addressed infra notes 387-98 and ac-
companying text.
33. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1982) (providing limited grounds for judicial va-
cation or modification of awards respectively). The problem of limited judicial
review of arbitral awards is discussed infra notes 402-20 and accompanying
text.
34. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982).
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agreements as a means of resolving private conflicts short of
the more costly and disruptive avenue of litigation."3 5 Because
of this strong national policy, courts construe arbitration
clauses to permit arbitration of the issue presented for adjudi-
cation whenever possible.36 Any doubts concerning the arbi-
trability of an issue, including analytical doubts arising from
the lack of clarity in the statutes, must, as a matter of federal
law, be resolved in favor of arbitration.3 7 Thus, for example,
when a party concedes that an issue is within the scope of the
arbitration clause but claims that the arbitration clause is itself
unenforceable, any doubts concerning the enforceability of the
clause must be resolved in favor of arbitration.3 8
2. Federalism and the FAA
Not every state subscribes to the federal government's lib-
eral view of arbitration clauses. 39 Some states are hostile to-
ward arbitration clauses in general;40 others are more selective
35. Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 558 F.2d
831, 833 (7th Cir. 1977). See Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Trailer Train Co., 690
F.2d 1343, 1348 (11th Cir. 1982); Stateside Mach. Co. v. Alperin, 591 F.2d 234,
240 (3d Cir. 1979); DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 520 F.2d 499, 505
(1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
36. See, e.g., Wick v. Atlantic Marine, Inc., 605 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1979)
("jUinless it can be said with positive assurance that an arbitration clause is
not susceptible of an interpretation which would cover the dispute at issue,
then a stay pending arbitration should be granted."); see also Southwest Indus.
Import & Export, Inc. v. Wilmod Co., 524 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1975) (courts
should give full effect to arbitration clauses to effectuate the intent of the par-
ties and to ease court congestion); Gait v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376
F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1967) (arbitration clauses should be construed, when-
ever possible, in favor of arbitration); Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 111
(9th Cir. 1962) (same).
37. See, e.g., Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314, 320 (6th Cir.
1983) (federal securities case involving pendent state claim under Michigan
Uniform Securities Act decided in favor of arbitration under federal law).
Where the FAA applies, the party seeking to avoid arbitration has the burden
of establishing that the FAA mandate is overriden. See SEC Amicus Brief,
supra note 21, at 8-9.
38. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 216-24 (1985)
(where state law based issue was within arbitration clause but was raised pen-
dent to a federal claim, plaintiff allowed to compel arbitration of the state law
based claims); Galt, 376 F.2d at 714 (arbitration clauses should be construed in
favor of arbitration).
39. This is true notwithstanding the fact that 43 states, Puerto Rico, and
the District of Columbia have statutes providing for enforcement of arbitra-
tion clauses. Meyerowitz, supra note 7, at 79.
40. See, e.g., Shearson, Hammill & Co. v. Vouis, 247 So. 2d 733, 735 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.) (refusing to oust the lower court of its jurisdiction by allowing
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about which arbitration clauses they void.41 Because of this oc-
casional state hostility to arbitration clauses, issues of federal-
ism arise when a party seeks to enforce such a clause in state
court 4 2 or when a party seeks enforcement of an arbitration
clause with respect to a claim under state common law43 or a
state statute.4 4 These issues are important in securities cases
both because the 1933 Act may be enforced in state courts45 and
because many federal securities cases involve pendent claims
under state common law46 or state blue sky laws.47
Not surprisingly, the federal government generally wins
these interjurisdictional battles. For the FAA to apply, the dis-
pute must involve a maritime transaction or a transaction in
commerce.48 The FAA broadly defines "commerce" to include
essentially all interstate and international commerce.
4 9
arbitration despite a statute providing an exception to the settled presumption
against arbitration.), cert. denied, 253 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1971).
41. See, e.g., Kroog v. Mait, 712 F.2d 1148, 1149 (7th Cir. 1983) (state secur-
ities statute purported to render void an arbitration clause in a broker-cus-
tomer agreement), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1007 (1984); Keating v. Superior
Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 595-99, 645 P.2d 1192, 1198-1200, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360, 366-68
(1982) (California franchise statute renders void an arbitration clause in a
franchise agreement), rev'd sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1
(1984).
42. See, e.g., Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 6-9 (1985) (holding that the federal
court's failure to review the state court's decision on arbitration might seri-
ously erode federal policy).
43. See, e.g., Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., 491 F.2d 1176, 1178 (2d Cir. 1974)
(holding that state claims which would have gone to arbitration by agreement
under state common law should not be joined to weak federal claims brought
under the Securities Act because pendent jurisdiction would burden federal
courts and the state courts are better able to decide issues of state common
law); Barbi v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 53 A.D.2d 562, 563, 384 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829
(1976) (upholding agreement to arbitrate in action brought under state com-
mon law rather than under 1933 Act).
44. See, e.g., Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314, 315 (6th Cir.
1983) (seeking arbitration for claims alleging violations of the Michigan Uni-
form Securities Act as well as violations of the stock exchange's and associa-
tion's rules).
45. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1982) (permitting suits to be brought in any
competent jurisdiction).
46. See, e.g., Kavit 491 F.2d at 1178 (client sued stock broker for alleged
1934 Act violation and asserted claims of negligence and conversion under the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine).
47. See, e.g., Liskey, 717 F.2d at 321 (federal securities case involving pen-
dent state claim under Michigan's Uniform Securities Act).
48. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 200-
01 (1956).
49. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), which states:
"[C]ommerce", as herein defined, means commerce among the several
States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United
1987]
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Although purely intrastate transactions are governed exclu-
sively by state law,50 the FAA is nevertheless fully applicable
in state courts to all interstate or maritime transactions, regard-
less of whether the claim being asserted arises under federal or
state law.51 If the arbitration clause at issue would be enforcea-
ble under the FAA, state antiarbitration statutes or antiarbitra-
tion common-law doctrines are deemed inapplicable under the
supremacy clause 52 and the issue of arbitrability is decided as a
matter of federal law.53
3. Applying the FAA to Securities Disputes
Securities cases in federal court often include pendent
claims for violations of state common law or state securities
statutes,54 primarily because punitive damages generally are
not available for claims under either the 1933 Act55 or the 1934
States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory
and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign
nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Terri-
tory or foreign nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
50. See Bernhard4 350 U.S. at 200-01, 203; Conley v. San Carlo Opera Co.,
163 F.2d 310 (1947).
51. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-14 (1984).
52. Id.; Kroog v. Malt, 712 F.2d 1148, 1152-54 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1007 (1984).
53. Tullis v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 551 F.2d 632, 638 n.8 (5th Cir. 1977); see,
e.g., Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1212 (2d Cir.) (issue of
arbitrability, as a question of "interpretation and construction," is governed by
federal law), cert denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972); Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v.
Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 385 (2d Cir. 1961) (same).
54. See, e.g., Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 558
F.2d 831, 832 (7th Cir. 1977) (investor brought suit against brokerage firm, al-
leging violation of 1933 Act and raising pendent state claims based on fraud
and deceit, and breach of contract); Wise v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 596 F.
Supp. 1391, 1397-98 (D. Del. 1984) (denying arbitration where federal and state
claims arose from a single recitation of facts); Cunningham v. Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 578-79 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (plaintiff alleged viola-
tions of the 1934 Act and brought pendent state claims in fraud, breach of fidu-
ciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 383 F. Supp. 265, 266 (W.D.
Tex. 1974) (action against broker alleging violations of the 1934 Act, the
N.Y.S.E. rules and the Texas Securities Act).
55. See, e.g., Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1283-86 (2d
Cir. 1969) (punitive damages not available in implied right of action under
§ 17(a) of the 1933 Act), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Avern Trust v.
Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1969) (no punitive damages under § 12(2)
of the 1933 Act); Shaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 1186, 1193 (N.D. Ill.
1970) (same), appeal dismissed, 463 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1972).
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Act 56 but may be available for state claims.57 Given the perva-
sive way in which federal law has gobbled up the enforcement
of arbitration clauses, the question arises whether state arbitra-
tion laws, some of which declare void agreements to arbitrate
state securities claims, apply at all to securities disputes.
Although some of the case law says no, the better reasoned au-
thority says yes.
In Coenen v. R. W. Pressprich & Co.,5 s the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit seemed to indicate that
any sale of securities would constitute commerce within the
meaning of the FAA and thereby call into effect the pervasive
federal regulation of arbitration agreements relating to such
sales.59 Coenen involved the private placement sale of a large
block of stock.60 Neither the appellate court's nor the district
court's opinion indicated that the sale of stock involved any in-
cidents of interstate or international commerce.61 Nonetheless,
the Second Circuit stated cavalierly that "[t]he sale of securities
here constitutes a transaction relating to commerce for the pur-
poses of the Arbitration Act."62
If the Second Circuit in Coenen meant that a sale of securi-
ties is necessarily a transaction in interstate commerce for pur-
poses of the FAA, the statement is difficult to justify. Certainly
a securities transaction can be limited to one state, especially in
56. See, e.g., Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 599 (3d Cir. 1976) (no
punitive damages under §§ 10(b), 28(a) of the 1934 Act in Rule 10b-5 cases);
Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 781 (3d Cir. 1976) (no puni-
tive damages under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291,
302 (2d Cir. 1968) (same), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
57. See, e.g., Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding
that although punitive damages are not available under either the 1933 or 1934
Acts, they are permissible on pendent claims of common-law fraud). For dis-
cussion of the availability of punitive damages under state and federal securi-
ties laws, see generally Krause, Securities Litigation: The Unsolved Problem of
Predispute Arbitration Agreements for Pendent Claims, 29 DE PAUL L. REV.
693, 709 (1980) (noting that state law claims are often included in federal se-
curities complaints to make recovery of punitive damages possible); Note, The
Severability of Arbitrable and Nonarbitrable Securities Claims, 41 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1165, 1167 ("The possibility of recovering punitive damages is a
primary reason that investors plead state-based causes of action."); Comment,
Punitive Damages and the Federal Securities Act- Recovery Via Pendent Ju-
risdiction, 47 Miss. L.J. 743 (1976); Comment, The Reappearance of Punitive
Damages in Private Actions for Securities Fraud, 5 TEX. TECH L. REv. 111
(1973).
58. 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 48-53.
60. See Coenen, 453 F.2d at 1210.
61. See id. at 1211, affg 329 F. Supp. 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
62. See id.
1987]
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the case of a private placement, where no national securities
exchange is involved. That fact was recognized in a more
thoughtful opinion by Judge Charles M. Metzner of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York in
1967. In Pawgan v. Silverstein,6 3 Judge Metzner held that the
FAA does not apply to claims under state securities acts when
the transactions at issue have no interstate elements.6 4 Judge
Metzner noted that the matter is a bit confusing, because the
federal securities laws can apply to such intrastate transactions
if the transactions involve the use of instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce.6 5 In other words, one can use means of inter-
state commerce like a telephone or the mail, thereby calling
into play the federal securities laws, and still have the transac-
tion be entirely intrastate for commerce purposes under the
FAA. Because of the long-distance nature of most modern se-
curities transactions, however, the commerce provisions of the
FAA will almost always render state arbitration statutes inap-
plicable to securities disputes. Nonetheless, given the proper
set of facts, the courts should apply certain state common-law
doctrines and statutes relating to arbitration.
B. THE ANTIWAIVER PROVISIONS OF THE 1933 AND 1934 ACTS
Absent other strong federal policies, the FAA would man-
date enforcement of all arbitration clauses involved in inter-
state or international transactions, as long as basic contract
principles did not create enforcement problems.6 6 As the
Supreme Court said recently, "The preeminent concern of Con-
gress in passing the [Federal Arbitration] Act was to enforce
private agreements into which parties had entered, and that
concern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbi-
trate . . .at least absent a countervailing policy manifested in
another federal statute."6 7
The antiwaiver provisions contained in the 1933 and 1934
Acts arguably manifest such a countervailing policy.68 In the
early twentieth century, the common law seemed to permit a
63. 265 F. Supp. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
64. See id. at 901.
65. See id.; see also Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 873-74 (10th Cir.
1982) (intrastate telephone call is sufficient to invoke federal securities laws).
66. See supra text accompanying note 29.
67. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
68. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently pointed out
that the FAA can be overridden by contrary legislation, including securities
legislation. See SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 8.
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party to waive his right to complain of statutory securities vio-
lations by the other party, at least if such a waiver clause was
not too misleading or tricky.69 Thus, the investor could, at the
outset of a transaction or relationship with his broker, absolve
the other party of all statutory liability for the other party's fu-
ture acts. In passing securities legislation, Congress consist-
ently voided such predispute waivers.70 Section 14 of the 1933
Act, which is universally recognized as being substantially iden-
tical to section 29(a) of the 1934 Act,71 is typical:72 "Any condi-
tion, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any
security to waive compliance with any provision of this sub-
chapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall
be void."73 Section 14 of the 1933 Act and section 29(a) of the
1934 Act mean precisely what they say: a predispute agreement
to waive substantive liability is void.74
69. See Cacket v. Keswick [1902] 2 Ch. 456, 476 (Ch. App.); Greenwood v.
Leather Shod Wheel Co., [1900] 1 Ch. 421, 435-38 (Ch. App.) (1899); L. Loss,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1189 (1983).
70. See Securities Act of 1933, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982); Trust Indenture
Act of 1939, § 327, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaaa (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 29, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982); Public Utility Holding Act of 1935, § 26, 15
U.S.C. § 79z (1982); Investment Advisors Act of 1940, § 215, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
15(a) (1982). England has also prohibited such waivers. See Companies Act of
1948, 11 & 12 Geo. VI, ch. 38 §§ 38(2), 47(5), 417(2). The ability of a party to
waive liability for matured disputes is discussed infra notes 193-216 and ac-
companying text.
71. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 224-25 (1985)
(White, J., concurring); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 514 n.7
(1974); Annotation, Construction and Application of § 14 of Securities Act of
1933 (15 USCS § 77n) and § 29(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USCS
§ 78cc(a)), Voiding Waiver of Compliance With Statutory Provisions or Rules
or Regulations, 26 A.L.R. FED. 495, 498 (1976).
72. There is a substantive difference between the antiwaiver provisions of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts on the one hand and the antiwaiver provisions of the
other securities laws on the other: all except the 1933 and 1934 Acts prohibit
waivers of compliance with orders of the SEC.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
74. See, e.g., Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 402 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting
the accepted rule that § 29(a) of the 1934 Act mandates that a release of claims
under federal securities laws is only valid as to "mature, ripened claims of
which the releasing party had knowledge before signing the release"); Rogen
v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 268 (1st Cir. 1966) (viewing contractual acknowl-
edgment of nonreliance as an agreement to waive substantive liability under
§ 29(a) of the 1934 Act); Schine v. Schine, 254 F. Supp. 986, 988 (S.D.N.Y.) (sug-
gesting that a promise not to sue for fraud, if incorporated into the transaction
to which the promise applies, is void under § 14 of the 1933 Act and § 29(a) of
the 1934 Act), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1966); Annotation, supra
note 71, at 499; cf. Foreman v. Holsman, 10 Ill. 2d 551, 554-55, 141 N.E.2d 31, 32-
33 (1957) (clause in stock purchase contract purporting to waive future claims
under Illinois securities statute is void).
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Section 14, however, means more than what it seems to
say, and this judicially discovered meaning creates problems for
arbitration clauses. Because the 1933 Act provides a plaintiff
with a multitude of judicial forums in which to assert her
claim, the United States Supreme Court in Wilko v. Swan7 5
held that a contractual clause calling for arbitration of future
disputes was void to the extent that it would force arbitration
of a claim under the express liability provisions of section 12(2)
of the 1933 Act.76 The Wilko decision is the root of the confu-
sion that has enshrouded this area of the law for more than
thirty years.
II. A PROGRESSION OF CONFUSION-WILKO TO
SCHERK TO BYRD
A. ORIGINS OF THE WILKO DOCTRINE
The plaintiff in Wilko alleged that he was induced by the
defendants, his stockbrokers, to purchase 1600 shares of stock
in Air Associates, Inc.77 through false representations made in
violation of section 12(2) of the 1933 Act.78 The plaintiff's mar-
gin agreement with the defendants provided that all future dis-
putes arising out of the parties' relationship would be submitted
to arbitration before the New York Chamber of Commerce Ar-
bitration Committee, the American Arbitration Association, or
the New York Stock Exchange Arbitration Committee, giving
the plaintiff the right to elect any one of the three.79 The de-
fendants moved for a stay, pending arbitration, under section 3
of the FAA.80 The district court denied the stay, and the Court
75. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
76. Id. at 434-35.
77. Id. at 428-29.
78. Section 12 provides:
Any person who ... (2) offers or sells a security ... by means of a
prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of
such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to
the person purchasing such security from him ....
Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
79. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 432 n.15.
80. Id at 429 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 3 (Supp. V 1952)) (current version at 9
U.S.C. § 3 (1982)).
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of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed."' In a seven to two
decision, the Supreme Court held that the arbitration agree-
ment was void under section 14 of the 1933 Act and reversed
the decision of the Second Circuit.8 2
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Reed, stated two rea-
sons for the Wilko decision. First, it relied on three sections of
the 1933 Act. Section 12(2), the Court noted, created a special
right nonexistent at common law whereby a purchaser of se-
curities could recover for misrepresentations without proving
scienter. Section 12(2) shifted the burden of proving lack of sci-
enter to the seller.8 3 The Court noted that Congress created
the special right as part of an investor protection scheme,
which added "let the seller also beware" to the familiar maxim
of caveat emptor.8 4 The Court further noted that section 22 of
the 1933 Act8 5 provides the plaintiff the option of suing in state
or federal court, does not permit the defendant to remove, and
allows for nationwide service of process.86 Finally, the Court
interpreted section 14 to void all waivers of the statutory pro-
tections of the 1933 Act.8 7 The majority held that a party's at-
tempt to waive the forum choices afforded by section 22
constituted an impermissible surrender of statutory protections
under section 14.88
Although it is unclear to what extent the Court's further
discussion contributed to the rationale of the decision,89 the
Court went on to state that arbitration affords less protection to
81. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953), revg 107 F. Supp. 75
(S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
82. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
83. Id at 431.
84. Id at 430-31.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982).
86. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431. The Court also added that if a suit is brought
in federal court, the purchaser has a wide choice of venue, and the jurisdic-
tional amount in controversy requirement (then $3000, currently $10,000) is
inapplicable.
87. .l at 434-35.
88. Id One court has recently concluded that a party may be compelled
to honor his forum-selection clause in a 1933 Act dispute if he is a sophisti-
cated investor. See Friedman v. World Transp., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 685, 690-91
(N.D. Ill. 1986). The subject of sophisticated investors and the different rules
that may apply to them is examined infra notes 234-53 and accompanying text.
89. The SEC recently argued that the perceived lack of protection af-
forded by arbitration formed the basis of the Wilko Court's holding. SEC
Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 10-11. The SEC also argued that arbitration
subject to the SEC's regulations provides parties' adequate protection of their
rights. Id at 12-21.
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a claimant than judicial adjudication in three respects. 90 First,
arbitrators receive no instruction on the law from a judge.91
Second, although an arbitrator must follow the law and not just
"considerations of fairness," it is impossible to review an arbi-
trator's application of the law because no reasons are given for
arbitral decisions.92 Third, the power to vacate an arbitral
award is limited because a party must show more than mere in-
correct interpretation of the law; a party must show a manifest
disregard of the law.9 3
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Minton, dissented.
He argued that nothing in the record of the case indicated that
arbitration would not protect the claimant's rights. The record
did not indicate that Wilko had no choice but to accept the arbi-
tration clause. Finally, Justice Frankfurter also noted that ar-
bitrators are bound by the law such that if they misapply it, the
award can be vacated.9 4
The Wilko decision has been lauded generally by commen-
tators.9 5 Indeed, Professor Louis Loss has codified its holding,
with some notable exceptions, as part of the Federal Securities
Code.96 As a matter of statutory construction, however, the de-
cision is difficult to justify. As the Court suggested, section 14
does not prohibit a party from waiving important rights estab-
lished by the 1933 Act.97 Rather, section 14 prevents one party
from releasing another party from the duty of "compliance
with any provision of this subchapter."98 In other words, an in-
vestor cannot release ab initio a broker from that broker's duty
to comply with the substantive mandates of the 1933 Act. To
90. The soundness of these and other arguments concerning the merits of
arbitration procedures is discussed infra notes 361-420 and accompanying text.
91. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436.
92. Id. at 433-34, 436.
93. Id. at 436-37.
94. Id. at 439-40 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The soundness of the dis-
senters' arguments supporting enforcement of arbitration clauses is discussed
infra notes 336-420 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., L. Loss, supra note 69, at 1193 (stating that result was "emi-
nently sensible"); Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Exam-
ination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REv. 481, 521 (1981)
(suggesting that the Wilko doctrine is a good blanket rule).
96. See 2 FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1725 (1980). The Code's version of
the Wilko doctrine includes the so-called "sophisticated investor" exception,
discussed infra notes 234-53 and accompanying text, as well as other excep-
tions to the general rule espoused by the Court in Wilko. See 2 FEDERAL SE-
CURITIES CODE § 1725(b)(3)(C). Professor Louis Loss was the American Law
Institute reporter for the Federal Securities Code.
97. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982) (emphasis added).
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read section 14 as prohibiting a claimant from agreeing to a fo-
rum change, however, even assuming that by agreeing the
claimant would be giving up important rights, is to read more
into the section than Congress put there.
Furthermore, the Court's reading of section 14 would seem
to void all agreements to settle disputes under section 12(2). If
section 14 means that a party cannot waive, even knowingly
and voluntarily, his right to sue in federal court, he cannot do
so in settlement of a claim. In a brief concurring opinion, Jus-
tice Jackson attempted to distinguish between predispute
agreements and agreements with respect to existing claims,99
and subsequent courts have read Wilko to support such a dis-
tinction.10 0 As a logical matter, however, the distinction is im-
possible to maintain under the Court's interpretation of section
14.101
To the extent the Wilko majority's discussion of the per-
ceived problems of arbitration formed any basis for the Court's
decision, the majority's analysis is fundamentally flawed be-
cause that argument proves too much. If arbitration is inferior
to litigation in the protection of substantive rights, that argu-
ment could serve as a basis for prohibiting the enforcement of
any arbitration clause.10 2 Nevertheless, Congress made the pol-
icy decision in enacting the FAA that the tradeoff of judicial
protection for decreased time, expense, and court congestion is
a good one that parties are entitled to make.1 03 Courts are not
free to second-guess Congress on such matters of policy.
The basic holding of Wilko has remained intact and largely
unchallenged for more than thirty years. Moreover, for years
some courts incorrectly reasoned that it was impossible to dis-
tinguish, for purposes of gauging the enforceability of arbitra-
tion clauses, implied causes of action under the 1934 Act from
the express cause of action under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act
involved in Wilko.'0 4 Nonetheless, the Securities and Ex-
99. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438 (Jackson, J., concurring).
100. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
101. See infra text accompanying notes 206-10.
102. See, e.g., In re Revenue Prop. Litig. Cases, 451 F.2d 310, 313-14 (1st Cir.
1971); Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1966); cf Sterk, supra note 95,
at 516 (noting that despite the possibility that an arbitrator will misapply the
law, and that the nature of arbitration usually insulates such errors from judi-
cial review, "[s]o long as both the arbitrator and the underlying law are work-
ing to achieve justice between the parties, the risk of error is not, and should
not be, particularly disturbing").
103. See supra notes 21-38 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 614-15 (7th Cir.
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change Commission (SEC) has recently argued that Wilko
should be overruled L0 5 and courts, including the Supreme
Court, have begun to carve away at the Wilko doctrine, primar-
ily by limiting the holding of Wilko to its facts.'0 6 The
Supreme Court's first opportunity to do so came in 1974 in
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 10 7
B. SCHERK AND THE CIRCUMSCRIPTION OF
THE WILKO DOCTRINE
Scherk is most commonly acknowledged as standing for the
proposition that international securities transactions are not
subject to the Wilko limitation on the enforceability of arbitra-
tion clauses.10 8 The case, however, stands for much more than
that.
The parties in Scherk were the Alberto-Culver Company, a
large American home products manufacturer, and Fritz Scherk,
a German citizen and the owner of several enterprises doing
business throughout Europe. 10 9 In the late 1960s, Alberto-Cul-
ver entered into negotiations with Scherk for the purchase of
Scherk's businesses. Negotiations stretched over two years and
took place in both Europe and the United States. The parties
eventually signed an agreement in Austria for the sale of the
businesses.110 The agreement contained an arbitration clause
which provided that future disputes be adjudicated under the
auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris.'
A few months after the deal was closed, Alberto-Culver
1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 383 F.
Supp. 265, 268 (W.D. Tex. 1974); Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423,
428-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 220
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Reader v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111, 114-15 (S.D.N.Y.
1961). In fact, at least one court has incorrectly stated that the Supreme Court
held in Wilko that agreements to arbitrate claims under the 1934 Act were
void. See Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21, 27-28
(E.D. Cal. 1974).
105. SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 12-21.
106. The various exceptions to the Wilko doctrine generated by lower
courts are discussed infra text accompanying notes 193-253.
107. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
108. See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030 (6th
Cir. 1979); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d
831, 835 (7th Cir. 1977).
109. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 508.
110. Id.
111. Id. The contract also provided that "[tihe laws of the State of Illinois,
U.S.A. shall apply to and govern this agreement, its interpretation and per-
formance." Id.
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discovered that Scherk had apparently misrepresented the sta-
tus of certain trademark rights. Alberto-Culver attempted to
rescind the sale on the basis of the alleged misrepresentations,
but Scherk refused. Following the refusal, Alberto-Culver
brought suit against Scherk in federal district court, alleging a
violation of Rule 1Ob-5."12
Scherk moved for a stay pending arbitration as contem-
plated by the agreement. Alberto-Culver opposed the stay and
sought a preliminary injunction against the arbitration proceed-
ings.113 The district court denied Scherk's stay and granted Al-
berto-Culver's injunction, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.1 14 Both courts relied
on Wilko,115 even though Wilko was an individual investor bas-
ing his claim on the express liability provisions of the 1933
Act 16 and Alberto-Culver was a large corporation asserting its
claim under the theory of implied causes of action for violations
of Rule 10b-5, which was promulgated under the 1934 Act.11 7
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that Wilko was inapplicable.:1 The Court, in a major-
ity opinion by Justice Stewart, presented two bases for the con-
clusion that the arbitration clause should be enforced. First,
the Court stated that "a colorable argument could be made that
even the semantic reasoning of the Wilko opinion does not con-
112. The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 pursuant to the authority granted
by § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, 891 (1934) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982)). Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which op-
erates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). Congress provided no private cause of action for
violations of § 10(b) or the rules promulgated thereunder, but the courts have
fashioned a private cause of action. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life
& Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
113. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 509-10.
114. Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973) rev'd, 417
U.S. 506 (1974).
115. See id at 614.
116. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
117. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 509.
118. I& at 515-17.
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trol the case before us."119 The majority distinguished suits
under the express liability provisions of section 12(2) of the
1933 Act from suits based on judicially created causes of action
under the 1934 Act. It noted that the Wilko Court had made
much of Congress's creation in the 1933 Act of a "special right"
for investors, not available at common law, to sue for misrepre-
sentations without having to prove scienter. Congress provided
no such special right in the 1934 Act. 120 Although both acts
contain essentially identical antiwaiver provisions, 21 the Court
also noted that only the 1933 Act contains all the procedural
rights-most importantly, broad forum-selection options-that
the Court in Wilko said could not be waived.-22 Thus, the
Scherk Court expressed its belief that implied causes of action
under the 1934 Act are distinct from express causes of action
under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. That view now commands
a clear majority of the Justices that make up the present
Supreme Court.123
The Court in Scherk expressed a second rationale on which
to distinguish Wilko, and it was this second distinction that the
Court found "crucial."' 24 Emphasizing the importance of com-
ity between nations and the importance of fostering certainty in
international trade, 25 the Court noted an important difference
between the agreements in Wilko and Scherk: "Alberto-Cul-
ver's contract to purchase the business entities belonging to
Scherk was a truly international agreement.'
' 2 6
The majority opinion also proffered some general thoughts
about arbitration clauses, apparently in response to the dissent-
ers' argument that the "loss of the proper judicial forum carries
with it the loss of substantial rights."'127 Severely circumscrib-
ing the Wilko Court's squeamishness about arbitration proceed-
ings, the majority stated that the Court had previously noted
that forum-selection clauses in contracts generally should be
upheld absent strong reasons to the contrary, and that an arbi-
tration clause is simply a specialized forum-selection clause that
119. Id. at 513.
120. Id. at 513-14.
121. See id. at 514 n.7 (stating that the differences in the two antiwaiver
provisions "seem irrelevant to the issue presented in this case").
122. Id. at 514.
123. See infra text accompanying notes 134-37.
124. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515.
125. Id. at 515-18.
126. Id. at 515.
127. Id. at 532 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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provides both the situs and the procedure for resolving the
dispute. 2 8
Then followed perhaps the most important portion of the
opinion: "For all these reasons we hold that the agreement of
the parties in this case to arbitrate any dispute arising out of
their international commercial transaction is to be respected
and enforced . . . ."129 Notwithstanding the Court's statement
that the international aspect of the case was crucial, this state-
ment of the Court's holding makes clear that the Court also re-
lied on the distinction it found between implied causes of
actions under the 1934 Act and express actions under the 1933
Act. In other words, the Court's reasoning regarding that dis-
tinction was a basis for the holding, not obiter dictum. The
point is an important one and most courts that have interpreted
Scherk have missed or ignored it.130
The Scherk Court refused to resolve several additional is-
sues raised by the parties. Scherk had urged the Court to limit
Wilko's holding to cases in which the party seeking to avoid the
arbitration clause was not in a position of equal bargaining
power with the party who imposed the arbitration clause on
him.131 This so-called "sophisticated investor" exception to the
Wilko doctrine has gained credence over time and has much
merit.132 The Court in Scherk expressly declined to consider
the issue, however, because it found other points dispositive. 33
One of the most noteworthy facets of the Scherk decision is
the way in which the Justices voted and what the votes indicate
about the inclinations of the current Court. Five Justices voted
with the majority: Powell, Rehnquist, Stewart, Blackmun, and
Burger. Each agreed there are important differences, with re-
spect to the enforceability of arbitration clauses, between im-
plied causes of action under the 1934 Act and express causes of
action under the 1933 Act.134 Three of the Justices holding that
view-Powell, Rehnquist, and Blackmun-are still on the
Court. Justice Stevens, then a judge on the Seventh Circuit,
128. I& at 518-19 (citing The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1
(1972)).
129. Id at 519-20 (emphasis added).
130. See infra note 275 and accompanying text.
131. Scherk 417 U.S. at 512 n.6.
132. See infra text accompanying notes 234-53.
133. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 512 n.6. The parties also raised questions concern-
ing the "sale of business" doctrine and the applicability of the United States
securities laws to international agreements, but the Court declined to decide
these issues for procedural reasons. Id. at 514 n.8, 516 n.9.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 119-30.
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was the lone dissenter in the Scherk court of appeals decision,
in which he argued against extending the Wilko doctrine to im-
plied causes of action under the 1934 Act.135 Shortly after the
Supreme Court decided Scherk, Stevens replaced the author of
the Supreme Court dissent in that case, Justice Douglas. An-
other of the dissenters in Scherk, Justice White, recently ex-
pressed his agreement with the view that the Wilko doctrine
"cannot be mechanically transplanted to the 1934 Act."' 36
Thus, five sitting Supreme Court Justices are on record as op-
posing the extension of the Wilko doctrine to implied causes of
action under the 1934 Act. In addition, the two new members
of the Court, Justices O'Connor and Scalia, are noted conserva-
tives not inclined to extend judicial doctrines where Congress
has not seen fit to provide an express basis for doing so. 1 3 7 The
view of the present Supreme Court, therefore, certainly seems
to be that Wilko should not be extended.
The Court's holding in Scherk was unquestionably a proper
one, as at least one commentator has stated.1 38 Lower courts
have repeatedly attempted to limit the decision, however, and
by doing so have grossly misconstrued both the majority opin-
ion in that case and the inclinations of the present Supreme
Court. Judicial attempts to limit Scherk generally have taken
two forms. First, some courts state that Scherk carved out a
narrow exception to the Wilko doctrine for international agree-
ments.139 As demonstrated, however, the majority opinion in
Scherk stands for much more than that.140 It would be more
accurate to say that in Scherk the Court recognized that Wilko
135. See Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 616-18 (Stevens, J. dis-
senting), rev'd, 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
136. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 224 (1985)
(White, J., concurring).
137. See, e.g., Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 106 S. Ct. 3143, 3150 (1986)
(O'Connor, J.) (observing that "'if the language of a provision of the securities
laws is sufficiently clear in its context and not at odds with the legislative his-
tory, it is unnecessary to examine the additional considerations of policy' ")
(quoting Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980)); Gott v. Walters, 756 F.2d 902,
906 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.) (In holding that the statute in question pre-
cluded judicial review of Veterans' Administration's use of certain methods
and documents in determining servicemen's injuries from radiation exposure,
Judge Scalia stated that the presumption favoring judicial review was over-
come by specific statutory language, specific legislative history, contemporane-
ous judicial construction and congressional acquiescence, or "'inferences of
intent drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole.' ") (citations omitted).
138. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 95, at 520-21.
139. See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030 (6th
Cir. 1979).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 119-30.
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carved out a narrow exception to the general rule in section 2
of the FAA that mandates enforcement of arbitration
clauses.1 4 1
Second, courts have attempted to limit the Scherk holding
by either expressly or impliedly treating the majority's disap-
proval of an extension of the Wilko doctrine to implied causes
of action under the 1934 Act as mere obiter dictum. 142 Until
the recent Supreme Court decision in Dean Witter Reynolds
Inc. v. Byrd,143 that judicial misconstruction of Scherk had led
some commentators to conclude that it was a matter of settled
law that predispute agreements to arbitrate implied claims
under the 1934 Act were void,1'44 and the lower courts generally
agreed.14 5 Some courts went so far as to make incorrect blan-
ket statements to the effect that after Wilko, no federal securi-
ties claims can be subject to mandatory arbitration.146 Indeed,
141. See supra text accompanying notes 21-38.
142. See Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1030 (rejecting the argument that Scherk
makes the Wilko doctrine inapplicable to 1934 Act claims); Weissbuch v. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 1977)
(Wilko doctrine applies to 10b-5 cases, absent international considerations
such as were dispositive in Scherk); see also Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., 661 F.2d
638, 640 (7th Cir. 1981) (implied actions under 1934 Act are subject to Wilko
doctrine); De Lancie v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 648 F.2d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir. 1981)
(same); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823,
826-29 (10th Cir. 1978) (Wilko doctrine applies to implied actions under both
1933 and 1934 Acts); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538
F.2d 532, 536-37 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976) (Wilko doctrine ap-
plies to implied actions under the 1934 Act); Davend Corp. v. Michael, [1975-
1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) f 95,540, at 99,730 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 14, 1976) (same); Seymour v. Bache & Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,402, at 99,057 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1976) (same).
143. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
144. See, e.g., L. Loss, supra note 69, at 1195 (stating that Wilko applied
fully to implied actions); Krause, supra note 57, at 701 (contending that "in
Wilko v. Swan the Supreme Court erected an absolute bar to predispute
agreements that would compel arbitration of federal securities law claims");
Note, supra note 57, at 1168 (stating that "federal securities claims are not sub-
ject to arbitration"). Of course, in light of Scherk these statements are much
too broad, see supra notes 118-37 and accompanying text, as was later made
clear in the Byrd case, discussed infra notes 148-92 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 640 (implied actions under 1934 Act
are subject to Wilko doctrine); De Lancie, 648 F.2d at 1259 (same); Moore, 590
F.2d at 826-29 (Wilko doctrine applies to implied actions under both 1933 and
1934 Acts); Ayres, 538 F.2d at 536-37 (Wilko doctrine applies to implied actions
under the 1934 Act); Davend Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) at 99,730 (same); Seymour, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) at 99,057 (same).
146. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Raymond, James & Assocs., 642 F.2d 791, 792 (5th
Cir. 1981); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 432 U.S.
910 (1977); Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100, 1103 (2d Cir.
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many defendants even conceded this point.147
C. BYRD AND THE DEATH OF THE INTERTWINING DOCTRINE
The Byrd decision for the most part corrected these mis-
conceptions. 148 Byrd was not, however, primarily about the en-
forceability of arbitration clauses as they apply to claims under
the 1934 Act. Rather, Byrd sounded the death knell for the in-
tertwining doctrine.
1. The Rise of Intertwining
The central problem presented in Byrd arose countless
times in the lower courts after Wilko was decided.1 49 The
problem arose when a party combined clearly arbitrable state
common-law or statutory claims1 50 with nonarbitrable federal
claims under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Faced with
this situation, the district courts had three possible choices:
send the entire case to arbitration, send none of the case to ar-
bitration, or send part of the case to arbitration.
The most obvious solution would be to sever the arbitrable
1970); Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 585 (E.D.
Cal. 1982); Berens v. Bache & Co, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 94,387, at 95,337 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 1974); Shapiro v. Jaslow, 320
F. Supp. 598, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
147. See, e.g., Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314, 315 (6th Cir.
1983); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 334 (5th Cir. 1981).
148. See infra notes 182-89 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 151, 153 & 154.
150. There has never been any doubt that state claims, even in securities
cases, are arbitrable. See Liskey, 717 F.2d at 320-21; Dickinson v. Heinold Sec.,
Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 642-43 (7th Cir. 1981); Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., 491 F.2d
1176, 1181 (2d Cir. 1974); DeHart v. Moore, 424 F. Supp. 55, 56-57 (S.D. Fla.
1976); L. Loss, supra note 69, at 1195. Until the Supreme Court asserted the
preeminence of the FAA over state law, see supra notes 48-53 and accompany-
ing text, some state courts had held agreements to arbitrate state securities
claims nonarbitrable under state law. See Sandefer v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 618
P.2d 690, 691 (Colo. App. 1980) (state securities claims nonarbitrable) (over-
ruled by Sager v. District Court, 698 P.2d 250, 255 (Colo. 1985) (antiwaiver pro-
vision of state securities law held contrary to the FAA and, therefore, void
under the supremacy clause)); Shearson, Hammill & Co. v. Vouis, 247 So. 2d
733, 735 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (state securities claims nonarbitrable), cert. de-
nied, 253 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1971); Kiehne v. Purdy, 309 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Minn.
1981) (holding agreements to arbitrate state securities claims void) (overruled
by Fairview Cemetery Ass'n v. Eckberg, 385 N.W.2d 812, 819 (Minn. 1986)
(holding state securities claims intertwined with common law claims are sub-
ject to arbitration)); State ex rel. Geil v. Corcoran, 623 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Mo.
App. 1981) (holding state securities claims nonarbitrable). But see Barbi v.
W.E. Hutton & Co., 53 A.D.2d 562, 563, 384 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (1976) (held state
law claims arbitrable).
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claims from the nonarbitrable claims and stay the court pro-
ceedings on the arbitrable claims pending arbitration. Such a
"sever and stay" approach found favor with many courts 51 and
commentators, 15 2 largely because the approach heeded the
Wilko doctrine while enforcing the parties' contract, as re-
quired by the FAA, to the greatest extent possible. Other
courts, expressing a variety of concerns, adopted the "inter-
twining doctrine," holding that when arbitrable claims are inti-
mately related factually to the nonarbitrable claims, the entire
intertwined package should be adjudicated in federal court
without arbitration.153 Still others acknowledged the appropri-
ateness of the sever and stay approach but, after ordering cer-
tain claims to arbitration, enjoined any arbitration proceedings
pending resolution of the federal court action.'
5 4
151. See Liskey, 717 F.2d at 320-21; Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 643-46; Davend
Corp. v. Michael, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,540,
at 99,729 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1976); Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
384 F. Supp. 21, 31 (E.D. Cal. 1974).
152. See, e.g., Bell & Fitzgerald, Mixed ArbitrablelNonarbitrable Disputes,
16 REv. SEC. REG. 849, 853 (1983); Note, supra note 57, at 1184-86.
153. See Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023,
1026-27 (11th Cir. 1982) (claims were inextricably intertwined); Sawyer v. Ray-
mond, James & Assocs., 642 F.2d 791, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1981) (bifurcation would
lead to duplicate review of same facts); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d
318, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1981) (claims were for a single legal wrong); Sibley v.
Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1976) (claims were inextricably inter-
twined), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977); Wise v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 596 F.
Supp. 1391, 1397-98 (D. Del. 1984) (all claims should be heard in one proceed-
ing to effectuate purposes of FAA); Frogner v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,504, at
96,927 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 1983) (bifurcation would result in duplication of
proof); Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 584-85
(E.D. Cal. 1982) (bifurcation would frustrate FAA purpose to make dispute
resolution faster and simple); Seymour v. Bache & Co., [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,402, at 99,058 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1976) (ju-
dicial economy requires litigation of entire matter in one forum); Shapiro v.
Jaslow, 320 F. Supp. 598, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (due to collateral estoppel effect
of arbitration, allowing arbitration of issues involved in nonarbitrable 1934 Act
claims would frustrate exclusive jurisdiction provisions of 1934 Act). Some
state courts have also applied the intertwining doctrine to nonarbitrable state
securities claims. See Sandefer, 635 P.2d at 549-51 (facts too similar) (over-
ruled by Sager v. District Court, 698 P.2d 250 (Colo. 1985) (holding state securi-
ties claims arbitrable)); Laurence v. Corwin, 75 A.D.2d 840, 841, 427 N.Y.S.2d
865, 866 (1980) (claims based on same facts).
154. E.g., Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 558
F.2d 831, 833-36 (7th Cir. 1977); Sennett v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1979-1980
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,378, at 97,502-03 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
9, 1980); Peacock v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 97,201, at 96,586-87 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1979); Stockwell v.
Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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2. The Fall of Intertwining
The Supreme Court took the proper approach in the 1985
case of Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd1 55 by rejecting the
intertwining doctrine in favor of the sever and stay approach
and by admonishing courts not to stay or enjoin arbitration
pending the outcome of the federal court action. 56 Like
Scherk, however, Byrd is much more important for what was
not explictly decided.
In Byrd, the plaintiff had sold his dental practice and in-
vested $160,000 of the proceeds with the defendant, Dean Wit-
ter, after signing an agreement containing an arbitration
clause. 157 The plaintiff lost more than $100,000 of that money
in approximately seven months. He brought suit in federal
court alleging violations of state law and Rule 10b-5.158 Dean
Witter moved to sever and stay the proceedings on the state
claims pending arbitration, 59 but assumed that the claims
under the 1934 Act were nonarbitrable and conceded that is-
sue. 160 The district court denied the motion, holding that the
claims should all be adjudicated together in federal court,16'
and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, adopt-
ing the intertwining doctrine. 62 The circuits were split regard-
ing the appropriateness of the intertwining doctrine, 163 and the
Supreme Court agreed to decide the issue. In a well-reasoned
opinion by Justice Marshall, the Court unanimously held that
the intertwining doctrine was inconsistent with the FAA. 6 4
The Court's decision two years earlier in Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.165 foreshad-
owed the Court's holding on the issue of intertwining in Byrd.
In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, the Court stated strongly
that the FAA "requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to
give effect to an arbitration agreement.' 166 The Byrd Court re-
155. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
156. See infra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
157. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 214-15.
158. Id. at 214.
159. Id. at 215.
160. Id.
161. See ic. at 215-16 (refering to the district court's denial of motion to
sever and stay proceedings).
162. Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd,
470 U.S. 213 (1985).
163. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
164. See Byrd, 470 U.S. at 217.
165. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
166. See id. at 20 (footnote omitted). That sentiment had been expressed
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lied heavily on Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital in its rejec-
tion of the intertwining doctrine. 67 The Court accepted the
reasoning of those courts adopting the sever and stay ap-
proach,1 68 stating that the FAA requires the arbitration of pen-
dent claims even if that would result in inefficiencies due to the
maintenance of proceedings in two forums.16 9 By rejecting the
intertwining doctrine, the Court signaled a further circumscrip-
tion of the Wilko doctrine: that Wilko represents a limited ex-
ception to the strong national policy favoring the enforcement
of arbitration clauses and cannot be used to swallow up the ex-
press mandate of section 2 of the FAA.'
7 0
The death of the intertwining doctrine also seems to mark
the end of the practice of enjoining the arbitration of severed
state claims pending the outcome of the federal court suit.17 '
The Byrd Court undercut the only two justifications for adopt-
ing such an approach: judicial economy 72 and collateral estop-
pel.17 3  The Byrd Court explicitly rejected the notion that
considerations of judicial economy can be a grounds for fore-
stalling arbitration. 7 4 The Court also questioned the reasoning
of some courts that had worried about the arbitration proceed-
ing resulting in a collateral estoppel of issues to be resolved in
the nonarbitrable claims being litigated in federal court.175
Without deciding the issue, the Court pointed out that under
McDonald v. City of West Branch176 it was at best unclear
whether a federal court would have to give full collateral estop-
by the Seventh Circuit in 1981. See Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d
638, 643 (7th Cir. 1981) ("A requirement to arbitrate may, in a particular in-
stance, result in some duplication of effort, but this prospect cannot vitiate the
agreement of the parties.").
167. See Byrd, 470 U.S. at 220-21.
168. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
169. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 220-21.
170. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), discussed supra notes 21-65 and accompanying text.
171. See cases discussed supra note 154 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Sennett v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,378, at 92,502-03 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 1980); Peacock
v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,201, at 96,586-87 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1979).
173. See, e.g., Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d
1023, 1026 (11th Cir. 1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 336 (5th
Cir. 1981); Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 550 F. Supp. 578, 582,
584-85 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
174. See Byrd, 470 U.S. at 220.
175. See i& at 221 & n.8 (citing cases supra note 173).
176. 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984) (stating that in a section 1983 action, courts
should not accord res judicata and collateral estoppel effect to an arbitration
rendered pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement).
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pel effect, in a federal securities case, to issues decided by an
arbitration panel. 177 In concurrence, Justice White was even
more resolute, stating simply that fears of collateral estoppel
are no reason to refuse to compel arbitration forthwith.178
Under Byrd, therefore, a court presented with arbitrable
state claims and nonarbitrable federal claims must, on the mo-
tion of a party, sever and stay the arbitrable claims and direct
that arbitration proceed without delay. 79 Those matters are
clear from the decision. As noted above, 8 0 however, Byrd is
perhaps more significant for what it did not decide. Justice
Marshall, who dissented in Scherk, asserted that Scherk "ques-
tioned" the application of Wilko to claims under the 1934 Act
but did not explicitly decide the issue. Justice Marshall stated
that because Dean Witter had conceded the point in favor of
nonarbitrability at the trial court by not moving to compel arbi-
tration of the 1934 Act claims, the Court had to decline to de-
cide that issue.' 8 '
In concurrence, Justice White was not nearly so reticent.
Although he dissented in Scherk, 8 2 he apparently had changed
his mind about the enforceability of arbitration clauses to the
extent they apply to implied actions under the 1934 Act. He
noted that the premise of the intertwining doctrine before the
Court was that the 1934 Act claims of Byrd were not arbitrable.
He also stated, however: "Nonetheless, I note that this is a
matter of substantial doubt.' 8 3 Justice White went on to ques-
tion the applicability of the Wilko reasoning to actions under
the 1934 Act. 8 4
Justice White first read the majority opinion in Wilko as
relying on three sections of the 1933 Act: section 14, which
voids waivers; section 12(2), which creates a "special right" not
available at common law in favor of plaintiffs; and section 22,
which provides a plaintiff with a large selection of possible fo-
177. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 222-23.
178. See id at 225 (White, J., concurring).
179. Some courts have stayed the nonarbitrable federal claims pending the
outcome of the arbitration. See, e.g., Adams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,328, at
92,175 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 20, 1985); Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., 613 F. Supp.
1123, 1124 (E.D. Mo. 1985). The advisability of this and other so-called "order-
ing" techniques are discussed infra notes 254-72 and accompanying text.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 155-56.
181. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 215 n.l.
182. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 521, 531-32 (1974).
183. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 224 (White, J., concurring).
184. See id. at 224-25.
[Vol. 71:393
SECURITIES ARBITRATION
rums and provides for nationwide service of process. Justice
White argued that, based on those sections, "Wilko's reasoning
cannot be mechanically transplanted to the 1934 Act."
1 85
Although section 14 of the 1933 Act finds a corresponding sec-
tion in 29(a) of the 1934 Act, the other two sections of the 1933
Act relied upon in Wilko have no counterpart in the 1934 Act.
Unlike the options provided by section 22 of the 1933 Act, the
1934 Act provides for much narrower jurisdictional choices for
a plaintiff; indeed, the federal courts are given exclusive juris-
diction over 1934 Act claims. More important, according to Jus-
tice White, is the complete absence in the 1934 Act of any
equivalent to the 1933 Act's section 12(2), which expressly al-
lows private causes of action. Under the 1934 Act section in-
voked by Byrd, section 10(b), the cause of action is a judicial
creation. Justice White reasoned, therefore, that the phrase
from the antiwaiver section of the 1934 Act, "waive compliance
with any provision of this chapter," is literally inapplicable.1 8 6
Moreover, Wilko's solicitude for the special right to bring a pri-
vate cause of action, which was granted by Congress in the 1933
Act, "is not necessarily appropriate where the cause of action is
judicially implied and not so different from the common-law
action."'81 7 Justice White concluded by stating that he raised
these points to emphasize that, notwithstanding all the lower
court opinions applying Wilko to the 1934 Act, "the question
remains open" and those lower court opinions "must be viewed
with some doubt.' 8 8
In fact, those lower court holdings must be viewed with
more than "some doubt." After Scherk and Byrd, no longer is
there any question where the Supreme Court stands on the is-
sue of the enforceability of arbitration clauses that apply to
claims under the 1934 Act,'8 9 particularly because five sitting
Justices are on record opposing extension of the Wilko doctrine
to claims brought under the 1934 Act. 90 Things have changed
since Wilko was decided. As Justice, then Judge, Stevens
185. Id. at 224. Such a mechanical transplanting had been part of lower
court reasoning. Id, at 215 n.1. See also Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
383 F. Supp. 265, 268-69 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (arguing that the 1933 and 1934 Acts
are identical insofar as the Wilko doctrine is concerned).
186. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 224-25 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
187. Id. (footnote omitted).
188. Id
189. As noted infra note 275 and accompanying text, there is still some
question about this matter in the minds of a few lower court judges, notwith-
standing the Supreme Court's strong statements.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 134-37.
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noted, since 1953 there has been an "increasingly strong en-
dorsement" by the federal courts, particularly the Supreme
Court, of arbitration as an alternative to litigation.191 The
Supreme Court has not yet expressly decided the question, but
it has seemed to be positively itching for the right case to pare
the Wilko doctrine down to its origins-express causes of ac-
tion under the 1933 Act. It now has that opportunity, having
granted certiorari in a case involving the arbitrability of a 10b-5
claim. 192
III. THE LEGACY OF THE WILKO-SCHERK-BYRD
PROGRESSION
After the Wilko-Scherk-Byrd line of cases, some matters of
doctrine are well-established while several important issues re-
main unresolved. Courts continue to debate what the three
cases stand for with respect to a number of questions.
A. AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE EXISTING CONTROVERSIES
One issue more complex than it would seem at first glance
involves the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate existing,
as opposed to future and as yet unforeseen, controversies.
Although courts generally agree about the broad principles, a
great deal of confusion remains about the details.
Courts and commentators universally agree that the Wilko
doctrine does not apply when a party agrees, after a dispute has
arisen, to arbitrate that dispute.193 A necessary corollary of
that rule is that if a party voluntarily submits a securities claim
to arbitration and is unsatisfied with the arbitrator's award, he
191. See Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 1973)
(Stevens, J., dissenting), rev'd, 417 U.S. 506 (1974). See also Tullis v. Kohl-
meyer & Co., 551 F.2d 632, 638 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that since Wilko was
decided there has been an increasingly strong judicial endorsement of arbitra-
tion). In other areas, the Supreme Court has recently come out very strongly
in favor of enforcement of arbitration clauses. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3353-54 (1985) (Sherman Act
claims must be arbitrated if the international agreement between the parties
so provides).
192. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986) (No. 86-44).
193. E.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1953) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1213 (2d Cir.), cerL de-
nied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972); Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d
242, 245-46 (3d Cir. 1968); Kribs v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., [1982-
1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 99,017, at 94,817 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 7, 1982); Annotation, supra note 71, at 499.
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cannot then seek redress of his grievances in court,194 even if
the claim is one as to which arbitration could not have been
compelled under the Wilko doctrine.195 Principles of res judi-
cata are said to be fully applicable to securities arbitration pro-
ceedings, thus precluding a party from taking multiple bites at
the apple.198 In fact, in at least one case a court awarded sanc-
tions against a party who sought to assert, in federal court, se-
curities claims that had been submitted previously to an
arbitrator.197
The rule according res judicata effect to arbitral awards is a
sensible, indeed necessary, one. Otherwise, a circular process
would result. After arbitration, the losing party could sue in
federal court. The winning party could then move to compel
arbitration, citing the FAA,'198 and the court would have to
grant the motion,199 assuming the claims are not ones as to
which arbitration clauses are void.200 The case would go back
to arbitration, and the process would begin anew.201 In addi-
194. E.g., Gardner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 433 F.2d 367, 368 (5th Cir.
1970), cert denied, 401 U.S. 978 (1971); Moran, 389 F.2d at 246; L. Loss, supra
note 69, at 1195. See also Behrens v. Skelly, 173 F.2d 715, 720 (3d Cir.) (com-
menting on the binding effect of an arbitration award in a nonsecurities case),
cert denied, 338 U.S. 821 (1949); Goldstein v. Doft, 236 F. Supp. 730, 732-34
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (arbitration award used to bar relitigation of claims in a non-
securities case), affd 353 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1965).
195. See Moran, 389 F.2d at 246.
196. See Pallante v. Paine, Webber, Jackson and Curtis, Inc., [1985-1986
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 92,219, at 91,615 (S.D.N.Y. May 14,
1985); Maidman v. O'Brien, 473 F. Supp. 25, 30-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also Da-
vis v. Chevy Chase Fin. Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (commenting on
the res judicata effect of an arbitration award in a nonsecurities case); Albin
Stevedore Co. v. Central Rigging & Contracting Corp., 308 F.2d 347 (9th Cir.
1962) (nonsecurities claims disposed of by arbitration award); James L.
Saphier Agency v. Green, 190 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y.) (valid arbitration award
has same res judicata effect as the judgment of a court), aff'd 293 F.2d 769 (2d
Cir. 1961); Livingston v. Shreveport-Texas League Baseball Corp., 128 F. Supp.
191, 202 (W.D. La. 1955) (same); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84
(1982) (stating that res judicata principles apply to arbitration proceedings); 18
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4475
(1981) (same).
197. Pallante, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
91,614-15.
198. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
199. See id. § 3.
200. See infra notes 273-313 and accompanying text.
201. Although principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel are some-
times confused, in this case the distinction is an important one. Res judicata
prevents the relitigation of claims; collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation
of issues. Although arbitral awards must be given res judicata effect to prevent
the circular process described here, such is not the case with collateral estop-
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tion, a contrary rule would eviscerate the provisions of the
FAA making arbitration clauses enforceable; 20 2 arbitration
would be a mere practice session and a waste of time and
resources.
The rule enforcing agreements to arbitrate existing dis-
putes also is a sound one, as even those who oppose enforcing
predispute arbitration clauses recognize. 20 3 Agreements to arbi-
trate existing disputes are closely akin to settlement agree-
ments,20 4 which must be enforced.20 5 As noted, however, the
distinction between predispute and postdispute arbitration
agreements is a difficult one to maintain under the reasoning of
Wilko and its progeny.
In Wilko, the Supreme Court took the paternalistic view
that section 14 of the 1933 Act 20 6 prohibits a party from waiving
her right to sue in federal court in favor of arbitration.20 7 If
section 14 really stands for that proposition, no logical reason
justifies limiting Wilko to predispute agreements to arbitrate.
Waiver is waiver, and section 14, according to the Wilko Court's
reasoning, cannot logically be limited to only predispute agree-
ments, notwithstanding Justice Jackson's concurrence 20 8 and
other courts' statements to the contrary.20 9 This is not to say
that the Wilko doctrine should be extended to void agreements
pel. The collateral estoppel effect to be given arbitration awards is discussed
infra notes 254-72 and accompanying text.
202. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
203. See, e.g., Note, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements In Fraud Ac-
tions Under the Securities Ac 62 YALE L.J. 985, 994-97 (1953) (arguing in
favor of enforcing agreements to arbitrate existing disputes but against enforc-
ing predispute agreements); Comment, Arbitration of Investor-Broker Dis-
putes, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 120, 137-38 (1977) (same). Even the SEC draws a
distinction between the two. See Notice to Broker-Dealers Concerning Arbi-
tration of Future Disputes, Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,122, at 81,976 (July 2, 1972) (stating that
SEC generally supports arbitration as an economical and efficient means of
resolving existing disputes but questioning propriety of brokers' use of predis-
pute arbitration agreements); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1814 (2d ed.
1961) (stating that the SEC had distinguished agreements to arbitrate existing
disputes from agreements to arbitrate disputes arising in the future in its ami-
cus curiae brief in Wilko).
204. See Note, supra note 203, at 994-95; Annotation, supra note 71, at 499.
205. See, e.g., Friedman v. Bache & Co., 439 F.2d 349, 349-50 (5th Cir. 1971);
Korn v. Franchard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 1326, 1328-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
206. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
207. See supra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
208. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(concurring with the Court's holding insofar as it bars only the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate existing claims).
209. See cases cited supra note 193.
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to arbitrate existing disputes or agreements to settle, but to
show the errors in the Court's reasoning in Wilko that section
14 of the 1933 Act prohibits a party from waiving her right to
sue in federal court.21 0 The Wilko reasoning simply proves too
much.
Although courts and commentators agree on the state-
ments of doctrine concerning the res judicata effect of arbitral
decisions and the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate ex-
isting disputes, certain details of application prove troublesome.
One problem, which only arises because of the fallacious dis-
tinction made between predispute agreements and postdispute
agreements, is defining when a controversy becomes "existent"
so that agreements to arbitrate it will be enforced. Suppose a
customer has reason to believe his broker has violated section
12(2) of the 1933 Act with respect to the customer's account and
thereafter the customer executes an agreement to arbitrate all
disputes. If only existing disputes under section 12(2) can be
forcibly arbitrated, the question is whether the broker may
compel arbitration if the customer sues under that section for
violations the customer had reason to know about when he
signed the agreement. The better authority seems to say that
the section 12(2) claim was an existing dispute at the time the
customer signed the arbitration clause if the customer had rea-
son to know about the violation.2 11
Courts recognize that although a party cannot give a valid
release of securities claims in advance,2 2 a party can irrevoca-
bly settle or agree to arbitrate claims that have ripened or ma-
tured at the time the agreement was executed.2 13 A ripened or
210. Other problems in the Court's reasoning in Wilko are discussed supra
notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., Korn v. Franchard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 1326, 1328-29 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Mittendorf v. J.R. Williston & Beane, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821, 834-35
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
212. See, e.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 268-69 (1st Cir. 1966);
Schine v. Schine, 254 F. Supp. 986, 988 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d
685 (2d Cir. 1966); Foreman v. Holsman, 10 Ill. 2d 551, 554-55, 141 N.E.2d 31, 32-
33 (1957).
213. See, e.g., Friedman v. Bache & Co., 439 F.2d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 1971);
Korn, 388 F. Supp. at 1328-29; Mittendorf, 372 F. Supp. at 834-35; Cohen v. Ten-
ney Corp., 318 F. Supp. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The justification for the rule
is that a party should be deemed only to have made a waiver when the party
knowingly and voluntarily relinquished the right to sue in court. See, e.g., Sey-
mour v. Bache & Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,402, at 99,058 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1976); Cohen, 318 F. Supp. at 282. If that is
the only justification for permitting enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
existing disputes, it is difficult to see why that would not also apply to agree-
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matured claim is said by the majority of courts to be one the
claimant knew of or, upon reasonable inquiry, should have
known of at the time of entering into the agreement.214 This
majority rule is not universally accepted. At least one court
has indicated that for the agreement to arbitrate to cover the
dispute as a ripened dispute, the controversy must already exist
and the claimant must already have full knowledge of the facts
at the time the agreement is entered into.215 That rule, how-
ever, would conflict directly with the widely accepted maxim
that, under the FAA, all doubts concerning the application of
an arbitration clause are, as a matter of federal law, to be con-
strued liberally in favor of arbitration.216 Moreover, such a rule
would merely benefit the lazy claimant and punish those who
exercise reasonable diligence over their financial affairs. For
good reason, the approach is not widely accepted.
The very existence of the rule allowing enforcement of ar-
bitration clauses with respect to existing disputes thus illus-
trates the judicial ambivalence about the Wilko doctrine and
represents one way courts, over time, have whittled at the
Wilko decision.
B. THE ARBITRABILITY OF BROKER-BROKER DISPUTES
Another subject that illustrates such a whittling away of
the Wilko doctrine is the arbitrability of disputes between ex-
change members and their employees. This subject also is
given to simple statements of doctrine but contains turbulent
undercurrents.
Each of the major stock exchanges requires that new mem-
bers217 agree to abide by the constitution and rules of the ex-
change. The constitutions of the major exchanges require
ments to arbitrate future disputes. Such agreements can be entered into just as
knowingly.
214. See Mittendorf, 372 F. Supp. at 834-35.
215. See Seymour, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
99,058.
216. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
217. Most, if not all, major brokerage firms are members of the national or
regional stock exchanges. Firms' officers are treated as though they were ex-
change members under the exchanges' definitions of "allied members." See,
e.g., New York Stock Exchange Constitution, art. I, § 3(c), reprinted in NEW
YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., CONSTITUTION AND RULES (CCH) IJ 1003(c), at
1051 (1986) [hereinafter N.Y.S.E. CONST. & RULES]. For purposes of this Arti-
cle, allied members are treated as though they were members.
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members to arbitrate all disputes with other members.218 Most
individual brokers are employees of brokerage houses that are
themselves members of the exchange. If brokers, in their indi-
vidual capacity, sue an exchange member such as their em-
ployer, that dispute must also be arbitrated21 9 according to
exchange rules.220 Courts interpret the exchanges' rules and
constitutions as contracts between the members.221 The ex-
changes' rules requiring members to arbitrate their disputes
therefore create predispute arbitration agreements between all
members of the exchange. Despite the Wilko doctrine, courts
uniformly recognize that when an exchange member has a dis-
pute with another exchange member, that dispute must be arbi-
trated on the motion of either party.2
22
The obvious question, at least with respect to express
causes of action under the 1933 Act, is why the Wilko doctrine
does not prohibit enforcement of these predispute arbitration
agreements between exchange members. According to the
Wilko Court's reading of section 14 of the 1933 Act, a party
cannot waive in advance her right to sue in federal court.
223
Courts justify the exemption for exchange members in two
ways. First, courts note that section 28(b) of the 1934 Act224
218. See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange Constitution, art. XI, § 1, re-
printed in N.Y.S.E. CONST. & RuLEs, supra note 217, t 1501, at 1075.
219. See, e.g., Katz v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 637, 640-42
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). But see Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
538 F.2d 532, 536-37 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding exchange rule requiring employees
to arbitrate disputes with exchange members inapplicable under facts of case
and further holding rule would be void if applicable), cert denied, 429 U.S.
1010 (1977).
220. See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange Rule No. 347, reprinted in
N.Y.S.E. CONST. & RULEs, supra note 217, 2347, at 3599.
221. See, e.g., Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1211 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1973); Legg, Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe,
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1367, 1370 (D.D.C. 1972); Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287
F. Supp. 766, 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
222. See Tullis v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 551 F.2d 632, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1977);
Muh v. Newburger, Loeb & Co., 540 F.2d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1976); Coenen, 453
F.2d at 1211; In re Revenue Properties Litig. Cases, 451 F.2d 310, 313 (1st Cir.
1971); Himebaugh v. Smith, 476 F. Supp. 502, 509-10 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Legg, Ma-
son & Co., 351 F. Supp. at 1371-72; Brown, 287 F. Supp. at 772-75; see also An-
notation, supra note 71, at 507-08 (stating that stock exchange arbitration
agreements are not voided by § 14 of the 1933 Act or by § 29(a) of the 1934
Act).
223. See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
224. Section 28(b) provides in relevant part: "Nothing in this chapter shall
be construed to modify existing law with regard to the binding effect (1) on
any member of or participant in any self-regulatory organization of any action
taken by the authorities of such organization to settle disputes between its
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permits the exchanges to mandate arbitration for disputes that
arise under the 1934 Act.225 By its terms, however, section
28(b) does not apply at all to the 1933 Act,226 under which
Wilko was decided.227 That has not troubled most courts; they
simply find the 1933 and 1934 Acts in pani materia and invent
the fiction that section 28(b) applies to both Acts.2 28 The logic
of these cases is so twisted it borders on the bizarre. Initially,
courts mistakenly apply the wrongly-decided Wilko case to im-
plied claims under the 1934 Act. Next, in analyzing those
claims under the 1934 Act, the same courts wrongly apply sec-
tion 28(b) of the 1934 Act as though it were contained in the
1933 Act. The result is that claims that should be arbitrated are
sent to arbitration, but only through the triple misconstruction
of the relevant statutes.
The second justification for the rule allowing exchange
members to agree to arbitrate disputes among themselves is
considerably more sound and is a variation of the "sophisticated
investor" exception to the Wilko doctrine. 229 Congress enacted
the securities acts in the 1930s in part to restore investor confi-
dence in the markets. 2 30 As one court stated, "It was assumed
that dealers could fend for themselves; it was the investing pub-
lic that was in need of protection. ' 23 L The 1933 Act makes no
distinction between dealers and other purchasers of securities,
however, so the Wilko Court's reading of that statute makes
this justification difficult to reconcile with that case. The justifi-
cation is nevertheless sound for implied causes of action under
both the 1933 and 1934 Acts. When the judiciary creates an im-
plied cause of action, it should be free to circumscribe that
cause of action as it sees fit. Circumscribing an implied cause of
members or participants .... ." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78bb(b) (1982).
225. See, e.g., Tullis, 551 F.2d at 635-38; Brown, 287 F. Supp. at 772-75.
226. "Nothing in this chapter .... 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b) (1982) (emphasis
added).
227. See supra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., Tullis, 551 F.2d at 635-36 (favorably citing previous court deci-
sions distinguishing Wilko and finding that § 28(b) of the 1934 Act also ap-
plies to the 1933 Act); Brown, 287 F. Supp. at 775 (stating that the 1933 and
1934 Acts were part of the same legislative program and applying § 28(b) to
the 1933 Act is in accord with legislative intent).
229. See infra text accompanying notes 234-53.
230. See Sterk, supra note 95, at 519.
231. Brown, 287 F. Supp. at 772 (footnote omitted); see also Coenen v. R.W.
Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1213-14 (2d Cir.) (citing language by various
courts emphasizing the 1934 Act's focus on protecting investors), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 949 (1972).
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action to conform to the policies behind the statutes under
which the implied action is created is clearly appropriate.
Although the doctrine in the area of exchange member dis-
putes is simple enough, complications arise for the same reason
they arise in the area of agreements to arbitrate existing dis-
putes. For instance, sometimes a situation will develop in
which a person has a dispute with an exchange member and
thereafter becomes an exchange member himself.2 32 Courts
handle such cases the same as other arbitration agreements en-
tered into after the dispute arose: only if the claimant knew or
had reason to know of the dispute at the time he became an ex-
change member must he arbitrate.23 3
The subject of enforcing arbitration agreements between
exchange members is important primarily because it represents
yet another way in which the courts have pared back the Wilko
doctrine. Although the 1933 Act sections found crucial in
Wilko make no distinction between brokers and investors,
courts have found in that distinction a way of limiting Wilko
even further.
C. THE SOPHISTICATED INVESTOR EXCEPTION-
ITS TIME HAS COME
The sophisticated investor exception to the Wilko doctrine,
like the rule permitting exchange members to arbitrate dis-
putes, is based on the policy behind the securities acts. It is an
idea whose time has come.
The primary purpose of the securities laws is to protect in-
vestors who are not able to protect themselves.234 It therefore
seems reasonable to ask, as many courts have,235 that limita-
tions on the strong national policy favoring the enforcement of
arbitration clauses236 be confined to cases in which the policy of
the securities acts requires that the FAA be so limited. The
232. See, e.g., De Lancie v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 648 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1981);
Coenen, 453 F.2d at 1210.
233. See, e.g., De Lancie, 648 F.2d at 1258; cf. L. Loss, supra note 69, at
1195 (stating that "depending on the circumstances" a party who becomes an
exchange member after the dispute arose may or may not be obligated to arbi-
trate). But see Coenen, 453 F.2d at 1212 (stating that member is bound to arbi-
trate any controversy).
234. See, e.g., Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 558
F.2d 831, 834 (7th Cir. 1977) (securities acts passed to protect small investors);
Brown, 287 F. Supp. at 772; Neville, The Enforcement of Arbitration Clauses in
Investor-Broker Agreements, ARB. J., Mar. 1979, at 9.
235. See infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
236. See supra text accompanying note 35.
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Supreme Court recently noted that the strong national policy
embodied in the FAA requires that agreements to arbitrate be
strictly enforced by the courts absent a countervailing policy
contained in another statute.2 7 Protection of investors, as ex-
pressed by the 1933 and 1934 Acts, constitutes such a counter-
vailing statutory policy.238 When investors do not need the
government's hand to decide which bargains are good and
which are bad, that countervailing policy no longer exists, how-
ever, and the FAA requires that courts enforce the contractual
agreement to arbitrate disputes.
As Justice Douglas correctly pointed out in Scherk, the se-
curities acts do not expressly distinguish between small and
large, sophisticated and unsophisticated, corporate and individ-
ual investors.2 39 For that reason, it would be a mistake to re-
fuse to accord any investor the rights expressly given her by
Congress. Nevertheless, Congress did not expressly mandate
that arbitration clauses be voided; even for express causes of ac-
tion under the 1933 Act, that result was reached by the courts
in a twisted reading of the statute.240 Moreover, Congress cer-
tainly did not create the private causes of action under the 1934
Act that are so often the subject of cases involving arbitration
clauses.241 Nor did Congress mandate that the Wilko result be
extended to those implied causes of action.242 When investor
protection is judicially created, the judiciary can and must limit
that protection to those whose need prompted the enactment of
the securities laws: individual investors not sophisticated
enough to protect themselves adequately. The strong policy
embodied in the FAA requires no less. Courts have begun to
agree and are now more inclined to read both Wilko and
Scherk in light of the identity of the party seeking to avoid
arbitration.
Two courts have expressly adopted the sophisicated inves-
tor exception to Wilko, holding that when both parties to an
agreement with an arbitration clause are sophisticated in busi-
237. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
238. See, e.g., Weissbuch, 558 F.2d at 834-36.
239. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 526 (1974) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) ("The Act does not speak in terms of 'sophisticated' as opposed to 'un-
sophisticated' people dealing in securities. The rules when the giants play are
the same as when the pygmies enter the market."). The majority in Scherk
refused to rule on a sophisticated investor exception to Wilko because it based
its decision on other grounds. See id at 512 n.6.
240. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
241. See infra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
242. See infra notes 290-92 and accompanying text.
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ness affairs, neither party may claim the benefit of the Wilko
doctrine. 243 Other courts seem ready to reach the same deci-
sion given the proper case. 244 Indeed, as some courts have
pointed out, the sophistication of the party seeking to avoid ar-
bitration was an aspect at work in both Wilko and Scherk.245 In
Wilko, the party seeking to avoid arbitration was an individual
investor; in Scherk, it was a corporation. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court has not yet placed its imprimatur on the sophis-
ticated investor exception, although it has been asked to do
so.
2 4 6
If courts adopt a sophisticated investor exception to the
WiZko doctrine, it should encompass at least three elements.
First, the key consideration for the exception should be
whether the investor is of a type needing protection from par-
ties who might trick, cajole or force her to give up the right to
sue in federal court. In many cases the party seeking to avoid
arbitration appears to have considerable resources, at least
judging from the size of the investments involved.2 47 Courts
should not base the exception exclusively on the financial re-
243. See Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14,24 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
GCA Corp. v. Coler, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,339, at 91,815 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1972).
244. See Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 558 F.2d
831, 835 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding Wilko doctrine applicable because, like Wilko
and unlike Scherk, plaintiff was an individual investor); Tullis v. Kohlmeyer &
Co., 551 F.2d 632, 634 n.4 (5th Cir. 1977) (refusing to apply Wilko, in part be-
cause plaintiffs were experienced businessmen); McMahon v. Shear-
son/American Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 384, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
("Arbitration clauses are routinely upheld by the courts, and, given plaintiffs'
sizeable investment, there is nothing to indicate that they were without bar-
gaining power."), rev'd on other grounds, 788 F.2d 94, 96-98 (2d Cir.), cert
granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986) (No. 86-44). Cf Friedman v. World Transp., Inc.,
636 F. Supp. 685, 689-92 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that forum selection clause
was enforceable against sophisticated investor). But see Newman v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., 383 F. Supp. 265, 268 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (refusing to adopt so-
phisticated investor exception).
245. See, e.g., Weissbuch, 558 F.2d at 835 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427, 435 (1953); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515-18 (1974)).
246. In Scherk the defendant asked the Court to limit Wilko to cases in
which the parties have disparate bargaining power. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 512
n.6. The Court declined to do so, basing its decision on other grounds. See id.
247. In one remarkable case, the plaintiffs, a husband and wife, alleged
that they had invested approximately $13.5 million with the defendant broker,
of which approximately $9.5 million was lost. See Brener v. Becker Paribas
Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also, Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.
v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 214 (1985) (plaintiff dentist sold his business and invested
$160,000 with defendant); Shotto v. Laub, 632 F. Supp. 516, 519 (D. Md. 1986)
(two of the plaintiffs, the Shottos, invested more than $125,000 with defend-
ant); Berens v. Bache & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
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sources of the parties, however, as some courts seem inclined to
do. 248 An investor may be of the type needing protection re-
gardless of her resources. Indeed, the financially unsophistica-
ted person who builds up a retirement nest egg or who inherits
a large sum may be precisely the type of potential victim for
whom protection is most needed.249 Resources should be con-
sidered by a court if the manner in which the plaintiff acquired
or used the resources indicates a sophistication in financial
matters.250
In addition, the party invoking the sophisticated investor
exception should carry the burden of demonstrating its applica-
bility. If the financial sophistication of a party is to be an ex-
ception to a general rule, it is consistent with standard burdens
of persuasion that the party invoking the exception bear the
burden.
Finally, institutional investors should automatically fall
within the exception. Although it may be true that some insti-
tutions are unsophisticated, if an individual making invest-
ments as a representative of an institution is not sophisticated
enough to hold his own in the rough and tumble world of fi-
nance, that person should be discouraged from dabbling in the
financial markets, not coddled by the courts.
Two commentators have suggested possible parameters for
the sophisticated investor exception that merit attention. One
commentator would allow a matter that otherwise would fall
within the Wilko doctrine to proceed to arbitration if a party
(CCH) q 94,387, at 95,337 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 1974) (plaintiff had invested
$55,000).
248. See, e.g., McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp.
384, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding based in part on plaintiffs' sizeable invest-
ment), rev'd on other grounds, 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60
(1986) (No. 86-44).
249. Actually, the FAA fully provides for protection of the unsophisticated
through its prohibition on the enforcement of arbitration clauses in circum-
stances whereby any contract would be held unenforceable. See 9 U.S.C. § 2
(1982). This would argue strongly in favor of overruling Wilko in its entirety
and enforcing all arbitration agreements unless one party can void the agree-
ment on a contractual basis as contemplated by § 2 of the FAA. Indeed, this
Article advocates that Wilko be overruled, either by congressional action or by
Supreme Court decision on just such a basis. See infra text accompanying
notes 426-28. Given the degree to which Wilko is imbedded in the jurispru-
dence of this area of law, however, the case probably will not be overruled by
the Supreme Court. Thus, the judicially-created sophisticated investor excep-
tion is the next best alternative.
250. See, e.g., McMahon, 618 F. Supp. at 386 ("Arbitration clauses are rou-
tinely upheld by the courts, and, given plaintiffs' sizeable investment, there is
nothing to indicate that they were without bargaining power.").
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could show that at the time the agreement was entered into the
parties had equal bargaining power.251 To base the exception
solely on equality of bargaining power, however, would be ill-
advised. Two parties both can be extremely sophisticated and
yet not have equal bargaining power. Furthermore, such a rule
would not automatically include institutional investors.
A better rule was suggested by Professor Louis Loss as re-
porter for the Federal Securities Code.252 Under the Federal
Securities Code rule, the Wilko doctrine would not apply "be-
tween any persons if a court determines, on consideration of
their financial and legal sophistication and the relationship be-
tween them, that the purposes of this Code do not require the
[voiding of their agreement to arbitrate]." 253 The only improve-
ment to be made on Professor Loss's rule would be the inclu-
sion of the express understanding that institutions as such are
sophisticated enough to warrant application of the exception.
Adoption of such a rule would protect all the interests requir-
ing protection. It would reconcile the conflicting policies em-
bodied in the FAA and the securities acts by enforcing
arbitration clauses to the fullest extent possible commensurate
with the protection of those who Congress felt were most in
need of protection-small, individual investors. Furthermore,
the rule would protect the parties' reasonable expectations as
expressed in their agreement.
D. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDERING
Whereas the sophisticated investor exception presents a
relatively clear choice to a court because the court can either
accept the exception or reject it, a more vexing problem con-
fronting courts that have to decide which issues to send to arbi-
tration and which to adjudicate is the problem of ordering. The
problem arises when a plaintiff includes in her complaint both
claims as to which arbitration can be compelled and claims as
to which the Wilko doctrine applies.2 54 The court can permit
the arbitration and court case to proceed simultaneously, or
rule that one should conclude before the other goes forward. If
251. See Neville, supra note 234, at 9.
252. See supra note 96.
253. 2 FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1725(b)(3)(C) (1980).
254. How these claims divide up-that is, which claims fall under the
Wilko doctrine and which do not-is discussed infra notes 273-313 and accom-
panying text.
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the court chooses the latter option, it must also decide which
proceeding should go first. This is the problem of ordering.
Several considerations are at stake in the ordering issue.
The most important is the degree to which collateral estop-
pe12 55 will affect the proceeding that goes last. If, for example,
an arbitration proceeding results in a resolution of issues that
then precludes retrying those issues in federal court, the mean-
ingfulness of the right to sue in federal court is greatly dimin-
ished. Concomitantly, if resolution of issues in federal court
precludes raising those issues again in arbitration, the arbitra-
tion becomes meaningless. Thus, if arbitration resolution is
given full collateral estoppel effect in federal court, or if court
resolution is given full collateral estoppel effect in arbitration,
the proceeding that takes place last in time is short-changed.
Until recently, courts and commentators generally agreed
that issues decided in an arbitration proceeding are to be given
full collateral estoppel effect in court.256 The Supreme Court
has since cast a shadow of doubt over the matter. In McDonald
v. City of West Branch,257 the Supreme Court held that a court
should not, in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, give
full collateral estoppel effect to an arbitration proceeding that
takes place pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.
The Supreme Court referred to McDonald in the Byrd
opinion in response to the plaintiff's argument that arbitration
of issues common to both arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims
would be inappropriate because collateral estoppel would effec-
tively make the arbitration proceeding one in which even non-
arbitrable claims were decided.2 58 In rejecting that argument,
the Court stated that it is unclear what preclusive effect an ar-
bitration proceeding would have on subsequent federal court
255. Collateral estoppel, the doctrine of issue preclusion, should not be con-
fused with res judicata, the doctrine of claim preclusion. See supra notes 196-
202 and accompanying text. Three requirements must be met for collateral es-
toppel to bar relitigation of an issue: the issue must be identical to the one
already litigated; the issue must actually have been litigated by the parties in
the earlier proceeding; and the determination of the issue in the prior proceed-
ing must have been essential to the decision in that proceeding. See Green-
blatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 1985).
256. See, e.g., Maidman v. O'Brien, 473 F. Supp. 25, 30-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
James L. Saphier Agency v. Green, 190 F. Supp. 713, 718-21 (S.D.N.Y), affd,
293 F.2d 769, 774 (2d Cir. 1961); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra
note 196, § 4475.
257. 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984).
258. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221-24 (1985).
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action.259 Although the Court left open the possibility that col-
lateral estoppel would make the arbitration proceeding one in
which nonarbitrable claims were effectively adjudicated,260 it
ordered the arbitration to take place nonetheless. 2 61 Appar-
ently the Court agreed with those courts that had taken the po-
sition that the threat of collateral estoppel "does not justify
denying arbitration of otherwise arbitrable intertwined state
law claims. '2 62 Justice White, in concurrence, made his view
plain by stating that fears of collateral estoppel almost never
justify refusing to order arbitrable claims to arbitration.263
Cases decided after Byrd have taken the hint and
rethought the maxim that collateral estoppel is fully applicable
to issues decided before an arbitrator. In a thoughtful decision,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit re-
cently ruled in Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.264
that application of collateral estoppel is within the sound dis-
cretion of the judge.265 The Eleventh Circuit in Greenblatt cau-
tioned that federal courts should be hesitant to give collateral
estoppel effect to an arbitration if it would result in the nonliti-
gation of claims that cannot be arbitrated.266 The Greenblatt
court nonetheless gave the arbitration proceeding full collateral
estoppel effect in the case before it. 26 7
259. See id. at 222-23.
260. The Court declined to decide the matter. See id. at 223.
261. See id. at 223-24.
262. Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 644 (7th Cir. 1981).
263. See Byrd, 470 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
264. 763 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir. 1985).
265. Id. at 1360.
266. See id. at 1361. Greenblatt involved multiple claims against a broker
by a customer, some of which were fully arbitrable, but also including a claim
under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),
which some courts, including the Eleventh and Second Circuits, have held to
be nonarbitrable. See, e.g., McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788
F.2d 94, 98-99 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986) (No. 86-44); Green-
blatt, 763 F.2d at 1361-62. There is, however, a great deal of authority to the
contrary. See, e.g., Sacks v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 627 F. Supp. 377, 379-81
(C.D. Cal. 1985); Ross v. Mathis, 624 F. Supp. 110, 116-17 (N.D. Ga. 1985); West
v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 26, 28-29 (W.D. Wash. 1985);
Finn v. Davis, 610 F. Supp. 1079, 1083 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Jacobson v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 92,276, at 91,899 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 1985), rev'd in par4 797 F.2d
1197, 1198 (3d Cir. 1986) (denying arbitration for RICO claim based on § 10(b)
of the 1934 Act, but compelling arbitration for RICO claims involving mail and
wire fraud).
267. The court decided that full collateral estoppel effect should be given
to the earlier arbitration proceeding as it had resolved the issues that would be
crucial in the nonarbitrable RICO action. See Greenblatt, 763 F.2d at 1361. It
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The Greenblatt decision represents a sensible approach to
the problem. Collateral estoppel is a common-law doctrine and
as such must undergo judicial modification and qualification
over time to meet changing circumstances. It should not be
construed to be so inflexible as to flout the will of Congress, if
the courts discern such a will,268 that certain claims must re-
ceive a judicial hearing. It is also reasonable, however, to leave
open the possibility that collateral estoppel effect will be given
to arbitration decisions when, as in Greenblatt, the court deter-
mines that the issues received a fair and complete hearing in
the arbitration proceeding and that litigation in federal court
would simply be a waste of time and resources for all
concerned.
Another consideration at stake in resolving the ordering
problem is judicial economy, a justification often cited by courts
that choose to stay arbitration pending resolution of the judicial
proceedings.269 This justification is inadequate to support stay-
ing arbitration, however, because the Supreme Court has ruled
twice recently that considerations of judicial economy cannot
override the strong national policy reflected in the FAA. 270
Under those decisions, it is improper for a court to stay arbitra-
tion pending resolution of the judicial proceedings.
Although considerations of judicial economy cannot fore-
stall arbitration under the strong mandate of the FAA, such
considerations do argue strongly against letting the arbitration
and the judicial proceeding go forward simultaneously. That
listed several factors supporting its conclusion that the arbitrated issues should
not be relitigated: the commonality of facts involved in the claims; the proce-
dural fairness of the arbitration proceeding, at which both parties were repre-
sented by counsel who made opening and closing statements and at which both
parties called witnesses; and the existence of a complete transcript and preser-
vation of all documents. See id
268. This Article argues that Congress has not expressed such a will and
that the Wilko decision is based on a misreading of the 1933 Act. See supra
notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
269. See, e.g., Sennett v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 97,378, at 97,502-03 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 1980); Peacock
v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,201, at 96,586-87 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1979).
270. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) ("The
preeminent concern of Congress in passing the [Federal Arbitration] Act was
to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, and that con-
cern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the
result is 'piecemeal' litigation .... ); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mer-
cury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1983) (the FAA "requires piecemeal resolu-
tion when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement") (footnote
omitted).
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being the case, the only reasonable solution to the problem of
ordering is to stay the judicial resolution of nonarbitrable
claims pending the outcome of the arbitration proceeding. This
solution seems to be the favored one among courts that have
faced the issue since Byrd.2 71 The solution is an ideal one,
given the competing interests at stake. Requiring the parties to
arbitrate and to litigate is worse than requiring them to litigate
all their claims, because it destroys all the advantages of arbi-
tration. The parties are not spared the expense of litigation,
the court docket is not any less crowded, and the time involved
is even greater. In other words, to require the parties simulta-
neously to litigate and to arbitrate robs the parties of the bene-
fit of the bargain they made.
On the other hand, staying the court proceeding prevents
the plaintiff and defendant from having to be in two places at
once. It also makes a settlement short of federal litigation more
likely because a party may rethink his stance in light of an im-
partial arbitrator's view of the case. Courts need not be con-
cerned about collateral estoppel because application of that
doctrine is within their discretion.2 7 2 Thus, there is a solution
to the problem of ordering.
E. THE CONTINUING PROBLEM: How FAR
SHOULD WILKo EXTEND?
The legacy of the Wilko-Scherk-Byrd progression pales in
comparative importance to the question that continues to per-
plex the judiciary: How far should the Wilko doctrine be ex-
tended? Wilko itself involved only an express cause of action
under the 1933 Act. The principal questions that remain un-
resolved are whether the Wilko doctrine, in light of Scherk and
Byrd, should extend to implied causes of action under the 1933
or 1934 Acts, or to express causes of action under the 1934 Act.
271. See, e.g., Becker v. Silverman, 638 F. Supp. 193, 196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);
Bale v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 650, 655 (D. Minn. 1986); Ad-
ams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,328, at 92,175 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 20, 1985);
Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., 613 F. Supp. 1123, 1124 (E.D. Mo. 1985). But see
Cummings v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 132, 133 (M.D. La. 1986)
(refusing to stay federal action pending arbitration of state claims).
272. See supra notes 264-68 and accompanying text.
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1. Applying Wilko to Implied Causes of Action Under the
1934 Act
The Court in both Scherk 273 and Byrd 274 seemed to speak
strongly against applying the Wilko doctrine to implied causes
of action under the 1934 Act. Although some courts have con-
tinued to hold that a party may not be held to her agreement to
arbitrate such claims,275 a number of cases have reached a con-
trary conclusion.2 7 6 In fact, in the Byrd case on remand, the
273. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text.
275. See Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d
1197, 1200-02 (3d Cir.), petition for cert filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 25,
1986) (No. 86-487); Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 522-27
(9th Cir.), petition for cert filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3159 (U.S. Aug. 24, 1986) (No. 86-
321); Miller v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 850, 854 (11th Cir.
1986); King v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 796 F.2d 59, 60 (5th Cir.), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3153 (U.S. Aug. 25, 1986) (No. 86-282); McMa-
hon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94, 96-98 (2d Cir.), cert
granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986) (No. 86-44); Intre Sport, Ltd. v. Kidder, Peabody &
Co., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 92,714, at 93,473 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 21, 1986); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 634 F. Supp. 587, 593 (S.D. Ohio
1986); Scharp v. Cralin & Co., 617 F. Supp. 476, 479-80 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Webb,
613 F. Supp. at 1124.
Although the SEC now takes the position that Wilko should be overruled,
and that arbitration clauses between brokers and investors should be enforced,
the SEC continues to deny there is any distinction between express and im-
plied rights of action on the issue of arbitrability. SEC Amicus Brief, supra
note 21, at 2, 7, 21-26.
276. See, e.g., Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795
F.2d 1393, 1397-98 (8th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3296 (U.S. Oct.
7, 1986) (No. 86-578); Steinberg v. Illinois Co., 635 F. Supp. 615, 618-19 (N.D. Ill.
1986); Fisher v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 635 F. Supp. 234, 236 (D. Md. 1986);
Sacks v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 627 F. Supp. 377, 279 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Gel-
ler v. Nasser, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,409, at
92,512 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 1985); Prawer v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 626 F.
Supp. 642, 646 (D. Mass. 1985); Jope v. Bear Stearns & Co., 632 F. Supp. 140,
143 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Peele v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 620 F. Supp. 61, 63 (W.D.
Mo. 1985); Ross v. Mathis, 624 F. Supp. 110, 115-16 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Land v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 52, 54 (E.D. Va. 1985); Marx v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9
92,311, at 92,112 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 1985); West v. Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 92,327, at 92,172
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 15, 1985); Hashemi v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 376, 380 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Jarvis v. Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1146, 1152 (D. Vt. 1985); Colangelo v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,365,
at 92,330 (M.D. Fla. July 23, 1985); Niven v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1985-
1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,257, at 91,796 (M.D. Fla.
June 27, 1985); Finn v. Davis, 610 F. Supp. 1079, 1081-82 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Rai-
ford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) t 92,269, at 91,856 (N.D. Ga. May 16, 1985).
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district court read the Supreme Court's ruling to require order-
ing the plaintiff's 10b-5 claim to arbitration as agreed.2 7 7 The
circuits are split on this point,278 and the Supreme Court has
agreed to resolve the split.279 As has been noted,280 some courts
have not followed the suggestions of Byrd and Scherk because
they read the suggestions as mere dicta that does not overrule
settled authority in their respective circuits.28 1 Other lower
courts have not been so reticent to reject earlier authority in
their circuits in light of Byrd.28 2
Aside from the apparently imminent Supreme Court ruling
that implied actions under the 1934 Act are arbitrable,2 83 and in
addition to the support for such a ruling in the better-reasoned
lower court opinions,28 4 compelling analytical reasons justify
enforcing agreements to arbitrate implied actions under the
1934 Act.28 5 The FAA's strong endorsement of enforcing agree-
ments to arbitrate and the policy that all doubts concerning the
The continuing vitality of many of these cases is called into question by subse-
quent rulings from the various courts of appeals. See infra note 278.
277. See Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 92,225, at 91,641 (S.D. Cal. July 8, 1985).
278. The Second, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have ruled
that implied claims under the 1934 Act cannot be compelled into arbitration.
See Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1202; Conover, 794 F.2d at 527; Miller, 791 F.2d at 854;
King, 796 F.2d at 60; McMahon, 788 F.2d at 98. The First and Eighth Circuits
have ruled that such claims may be compelled into arbitration. See Page v.
Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1986);
Phillips, 795 F.2d at 1399.
279. See McMahon, 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986)
(No. 86-44).
280. See, e.g., Shotto v. Laub, 632 F. Supp. 516, 524-25 (D. Md. 1986);
Prawer, 626 F. Supp. at 646 n.1.
281. See, e.g., Miller, 791 F.2d at 854; McMahon, 788 F.2d at 98; Intre Sport,
Ltd. v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., [Current Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) %
92,714, at 93,472-73 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1986); Scharp v. Cralin & Co., 617 F.
Supp. 476, 479 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
282. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Illinois Co., 635 F. Supp. 615, 618 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(stating that the court was "convinced" that the Seventh Circuit would not fol-
low earlier authority holding 1934 Act claims arbitrable).
283. As noted above, supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text, five sitting
Supreme Court Justices have already expressed disapproval of extending
Wilko to 1934 Act claims. These proclivities of individual Justices have not es-
caped the notice of lower courts. See, e.g., Halliburton & Assocs. v. Henderson,
Few & Co., 774 F.2d 441, 445 (11th Cir. 1985) (refusing to grant plaintiff leave
to amend its complaint to include claims under the 1933 Act, by which plaintiff
hoped to defeat defendant's motion to compel arbitration between the par-
ties-both municipal bond dealers-and thereby refusing to extend Wilo to
1934 Act claim, noting that Justices White and Stevens have questioned such
an extension).
284. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
285. Commentators are beginning to come around on this issue. See, e.g.,
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enforceability of such clauses, including analytical doubts, are
to be resolved in favor of arbitration underly the argument for
enforcing such agreements. 28 6 Furthermore, Justice White was
correct when he noted in Byrd that Wilko's reasoning cannot
be mechanically applied to implied actions under the 1934
Act.28 7 The Wilko Court considered it crucial that in enacting
the 1933 Act Congress intended plaintiffs to have a wide choice
of judicial forums, 28 8 as the Supreme Court has since ob-
served.28 9 Congress intended plaintiffs suing under the 1934 Act
to have much more limited judicial access.2 90
Furthermore, the Wilko Court emphasized that in section
12(2) Congress gave plaintiffs a special right, not available at
common law, to sue for misrepresentations without having to
prove scienter. Implied causes of action under the 1934 Act do
not invoke a congressionally given right at all; rather, the right
to sue is judicially created. As the Supreme Court recently said
in a nonsecurities case, a party "should be held to [its agree-
ment to arbitrate] unless Congress itself has evinced an inten-
tion to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory
rights at issue."291 For implied causes of action, Congress has
not provided judicial remedies at all. It necessarily follows that
Congress has not evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of
any judicial remedies.2 92
Thus, even if one accepts the dubious proposition that
Wilko was rightly decided, agreements to arbitrate claims that
arise because of implied causes of action under the 1934 Act
should be enforced.
2. Applying Wilko to Express Causes of Action
Under the 1934 Act
The argument for the enforceability of agreements to arbi-
trate express causes of action under the 1934 Act is less strong
Katsoris, supra note 9, at 300 (arguing against applying Wilko doctrine to 1934
Act claims).
286. See supra notes 21-38 and accompanying text.
287. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 224 (1985) (White, J.
concurring).
288. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1953).
289. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1974).
290. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982) (providing for exclusive federal
jurisdiction).
291. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S.
Ct. 3346, 3355 (1985); Ross v. Mathis, 624 F. Supp. 110, 116 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
292. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 105 S. Ct. at 3355; Ross, 624 F. Supp. at
[Vol. 71:393
SECURITIES ARBITRATION
but still persuasive. Cases involving the enforceability of agree-
ments to arbitrate 1934 Act claims consist almost exclusively of
10b-5 claims, 293 for which the judicial remedy is implied.294 The
1934 Act, however, does contain express provisions for civil lia-
bility in cases of misleading filings with the SEC,295 manipula-
tion of securities prices 296 and insider short-swing profits.29 7
Many cases seem to say that parties can enforce agreements to
arbitrate disputes under those sections of the 1934 Act. Those
cases, however, involved 10b-5 claims, and the courts speak of
1934 Act claims as though express and implied causes are indis-
tinguishable on the arbitrability issue.298 Such a supposition is
dangerous, however, because for express causes of action under
the 1934 Act, one of the primary justifications for not extending
the Wilko decision-that Congress has not provided a judicial
remedy not to be waived 29 9-- is not present. Nonetheless, in-
dependent reasons support enforcing an agreement to arbitrate
disputes under any section of the 1934 Act, even if Wilko was
rightly decided. The most important independent justification
is the degree to which Wilko relied on the expanded forum
choice for 1933 Act claims-forum choices not provided for in
the 1934 Act.30 0
Because the types of transactions that would lead to a
claim under one of the express causes of action afforded by the
1934 Act are not the type that typically would occur under a
written agreement, motions to arbitrate such claims will be
rare. When presented with such a motion, however, courts
should not hesitate to order the claim to arbitration even
293. See, e.g., McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94
(2d Cir.), cert granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986) (No. 86-44); Steinberg v. Illinois Co.,
635 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 634 F. Supp.
587 (S.D. Ohio 1986); Sacks v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 627 F. Supp. 377
(C.D. Cal. 1985); Colangelo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,365 (M.D. Fla. July 23, 1985).
294. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
295. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1982).
296. Id. § 78i.
297. Id. § 78p(b).
298. See, e.g., Jope v. Bear Stearns & Co., 632 F. Supp. 140, 143 (N.D. Cal.
1985) (holding the 10b-5 claim subject to arbitration in light of the "trend to-
wards permitting arbitration of 1934 Act claims"); Ross v. Mathis, 624 F. Supp.
110, 115 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (ignoring the express provisions for civil liability con-
tained in the 1934 Act and stating that the 1934 Act provides only for implied
rights of action).
299. See supra notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 288-90 and accompanying text.
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though the case for arbitration is not as strong as for implied
actions under the 1934 Act.
3. Applying Wilko to Implied Rights of Action
Under the 1933 Act
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act301 provides a counterpart to
Rule 10b-5 promulgated under the 1934 Act.30 2 Although Con-
gress has not provided a judicial remedy for violations of sec-
tion 17(a), many courts have implied a private cause of
action.30 3 Careful analysis suggests that a party should be able
to compel arbitration of a claim under section 17(a), and recent
decisions indicate that some courts agree.30 4
All the arguments favoring compelling arbitration of im-
plied actions under the 1934 Act30 5 apply, except that section
17(a) is found in the 1933 Act, where Congress has provided a
multitude of possible forums from which a plaintiff may
choose.30 6 The broad choice of forums was one reason the
Wilko Court held there could be no compulsory arbitration of
claims under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act.30 7 The Wilko chain
301. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1982).
302. Section 17(a), as codified, is almost identical to Rule 10b-5. Compare
the language of Rule 10b-5, quoted supra note 112, with the following-
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any se-
curities...
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser.
Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1982).
303. See, e.g., Berger v. Bishop Inv. Corp., 695 F.2d 302, 305 (8th Cir. 1982);
Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808, 815 (9th Cir. 1981);
Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978). But see Landry v.
All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 389-91 (5th Cir. 1982) (no private cause of
action under § 17(a)); Kaufman v. Magid, 539 F. Supp. 1088, 1097-98 (D. Mass.
1982) (same). Professor Loss has come down strongly on the side disapproving
a private cause of action under § 17(a). See L. LOSS, supra note 69, at 1148
("Will § 17(a) of the 1933 Act support a private right of action? ... If anything
in the 1933 Act can be stated categorically, the answer should be no.").
304. See, e.g., Brener v. Becker Paribas Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442, 449 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (holding that claims under § 17(a) must be arbitrated pursuant to the
agreement of the parties).
305. See supra notes 273-92 and accompanying text.
306. See 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1982) (providing for concurrent state and federal
jurisdiction over § 77 claims).
307. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 71:393
SECURITIES ARBITRATION
of reasoning is broken for section 17(a) claims by the absence of
one of the considerations the Wilko Court found crucial. In
Wilko, the Court noted that Congress had provided an express
remedy in section 12(2) and had provided a broad choice of fo-
rums in section 22.308 It was this combination of sections that
led the Court to the result it reached.30 9 For claims under sec-
tion 17(a), there is no congressional mandate that a plaintiff be
accorded the forum choice contained in the 1933 Act, because
Congress has not provided for private causes of action at all
under that section. Rather, the courts have provided the cause
of action. For that reason the courts cannot say about section
17(a), as the Court in Wilko did about section 12(2), that Con-
gress has given plaintiffs a remedy and a choice of judicial fo-
rums. The same would hold true for any other implied causes
of action under the 1933 Act.3 10
A second reason for compelling arbitration of claims under
section 17(a) stems from the similarity between section 17(a)
and Rule 10b-5.311 The holding that 10b-5 claims must be arbi-
trated3 12 would be eviscerated if plaintiffs could simply state
their claim as one under section 17(a) instead and thereby avoid
having to arbitrate pursuant to their agreement.31 3
308. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953).
309. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 224 (1985)
(White, J., concurring) (noting that the Wilko Court relied on three intercon-
nected statutory provisions in holding arbitration agreements unenforceable
with regards to claims under § 12(2) of the 1933 Act: § 14, which voids stipula-
tions binding persons acquiring securities to waive compliance with any provi-
sion of the Act; § 12(2), which creates a right to recover for misrepresentation
that is substantially different from the common law; and § 22, which allows
suit in any state or federal court of competent jurisdiction and provides for na-
tionwide service of process).
310. An additional question that arises is whether the Wilko doctrine
should be extended to implied causes of action under rules promulgated by the
Federal Research Board or the numerous SROs. Courts have found implied
causes of action for dozens of statutory and regulatory provisions relating to
securities. See generally 2 FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1722 (1980) (listing 31
statutory and regulatory provisions for which courts have implied causes of ac-
tion). All the arguments in favor of enforcing agreements to arbitrate implied
causes of action under Rule 10b-5 are applicable to any implied causes of ac-
tion under any statutory or regulatory provision except the 1933 Act. See
supra notes 273-92 and accompanying text. For these reasons, courts should
not hesitate to enforce arbitration clauses that apply to securities claims made
pursuant to the doctrine of implied causes of action.
311. See supra note 302 and accompanying text. See also Brener v. Becker
Paribas Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that § 17(a) and Rule
10b-5 are substantially identical).
312. See cases cited supra note 276.
313. Evisceration may be unavoidable, however, in light of recent cases
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4. Rule 15c2-2 and the Effect of an Improvidently Made Rule
One illustration of the dynamism that permeates this sub-
ject is the rapidity with which the law concerning the enforce-
ability of arbitration clauses has changed in the past few years.
Whereas only a few years ago nearly all courts assumed that
implied actions under the 1934 Act were subject to the Wilko
doctrine, 314 many courts now take the contrary position.3 15
Even when courts agreed that 1934 Act claims were not arbitra-
ble, some broker-dealers nevertheless continued to include in
some of their customer agreements arbitration clauses purport-
ing to cover all disputes.316 That practice created some concern
within the SEC that investors might be deceived into believing
that they had irrevocably waived their right to sue in federal
court for violations of the 1934 Act.3 17 The SEC's concern led
it, in 1979, to promulgate Release No. 15,984, in which the SEC
stated that such a practice was misleading and questioned its
advisability under the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act.318
Although one court refused to enforce an arbitration agree-
ment that did not distinguish between arbitrable and unarbi-
trable claims,319 that case was later overruled,320 and courts
now recognize that the Release can have no effect on the en-
forceability of an arbitration clause.32 1
holding that a mere broker can be liable as a "seller" under § 12(2) of the 1933
Act. See, e.g., Lukovich v. E.F. Hutton & Co., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 92,701, at 93,412-13 (D. Or. Apr. 21, 1986); Frogner v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 99,504, at 96,927-28 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 1983). If the same types
of practices that would lead to broker liability under 10b-5 would also support
an action under § 12(2), a plaintiff could ensure the application of the Wilko
decision by suing under § 12(2) instead. Section 12(2) could prove to be a much
more hospitable section for plaintiffs, because it shifts the burden of proving
lack of scienter onto the defendant. See 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
314. See cases cited supra note 104.
315. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
316. See Exchange Act Release No. 15,984 [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) f, 82,122, at 81,975 (July 2, 1979) ("Some broker-dealer customer
agreements appear to bind customers to arbitrate all future disputes with a
broker-dealer.").
317. See id. at 81,978.
318. See id.
319. Bear, Stearns & Co. v. Weiss, 104 Misc. 2d 876, 878, 429 N.Y.S.2d 156,
158 (1980).
320. See Harris v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 82 A.D.2d 87, 89-90, 441
N.Y.S.2d 70, 72-3 (1981), affd, 56 N.Y.2d 627, 435 N.E.2d 1097, 450 N.Y.S.2d 482
(1982).
321. See, e.g., Jope v. Bear Stearns & Co., 632 F. Supp. 140, 143 (N.D. Cal.
1985).
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The SEC, however, did not stop with the one release. Be-
cause the use of broad arbitration clauses continued,322 the SEC
in 1983 promulgated Rule 15c2-2 under the authority of section
15(c)(2) of the 1934 Act.3 2s This rule made it a fraudulent act,
for purposes of section 15(c)(2), for a broker-dealer to use a
form of agreement that purported to bind the customer to arbi-
tration of claims under the 1934 Act.3 2 The SEC promulgated
the rule on the assumption that an agreement to arbitrate
claims under the 1934 Act is void.325 Despite the change in the
judicial attitude after Byrd,326 the rule remains, raising the
question of the rule's current effect. The short answer is that
the rule is of no effect to the extent it is premised on an erro-
neous assumption of law.
Rule 15c2-2 is interpretive, designed to give meaning to the
legislative proscription of fraudulent and manipulative prac-
tices contained in section 15(c)(2) and, as such, does not have
the force of law.3 27 It merely represents public notice of the
SEC's construction of the statute, which is all-important in the
case of rules promulgated under section 15(c)(2), because only
the SEC can enforce the section.3 28 Even if the rule is substan-
tive, however, and therefore has the force of law,329 it cannot
supersede the judicial decisions holding 1934 Act claims arbitra-
ble.330 Moreover, Rule 15c2-2 was not intended to affect the
322. See 48 Fed. Reg. 53,404 (1983) (SEC found many brokers continued to
use arbitration clauses despite contrary law which prohibits this language).
The rule following this explanation is codified as amended at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c2-2 (1986).
323. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1986) (promulgated pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2) (1982)). Section 15(c)(2)
proscribes fraudulent and manipulative practices on the part of broker-dealers
and authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules setting forth the acts that are
fraudulent or manipulative.
324. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1986).
325. See Exchange Act Release No. 20,397, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,404 (1983) (codi-
fied as amended at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1986)) ("statutory and case law
clearly render unenforceable agreements to arbitrate future disputes between
broker-dealers and their public customers"). The SEC now confesses that this
erroneous view motivated the promulgation of Rule 15c2-2 and the issue of Re-
lease No. 15,984. SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 18 n.13.
326. See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
327. See Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins.
Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 664-65 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Washington Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 526 F. Supp. 343, 383 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
328. See Shotto v. Laub, 632 F. Supp. 516, 518 n.2 (D. Md. 1986) (There are
no private causes of action for violation of Rule 15c2.).
329. See Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 589 F.2d at 664; Washington
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 526 F. Supp. at 383.
330. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982) (courts must set aside substantive rules to the
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substantive rights of a customer or a broker to a judicial hear-
ing or arbitration. Rather, it was procedural in nature,
designed to ensure notice to the customer of his rights under
the law.331
Because the law has changed since the rule was promul-
gated,332 courts recognize that a broker's use of an arbitration
clause apparently in violation of Rule 15c2-2 cannot render the
clause unenforceable when substantive law mandates enforce-
ment.333 That is not to say, however, that the rule has had no
effect. In an attempt to comply with the SEC directive, some
brokers have inserted language into their customer agreements
stating that the agreement to arbitrate does not affect the cus-
tomer's right to a judicial hearing on claims under the securi-
ties laws. 334 This practice has led some courts to refuse to
compel arbitration of claims under the 1934 Act. 335 Those deci-
sions are clearly sound, because it would be unfair to force a
customer to arbitrate a claim that his contract suggests will not
be arbitrated. Such decisions, however, put the broker in an
unfair bind. She must either flout an SEC rule, a poor idea
even if the rule was improvidently promulgated, or forego her
right to arbitrate claims which the courts have said are arbitra-
extent those rules exceed statutory authority or are otherwise not in conform-
ity with law).
331. See Shotto, 632 F. Supp. at 527; Finkle & Ross v. A.G. Becker Paribas,
Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1505, 1510 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
332. See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
333. See, e.g., Fisher v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 635 F. Supp. 234, 236-37
(D. Md. 1986) (finding case law following promulgation of Rule 15c2-2 favors
arbitration); Finkle & Ross, 622 F. Supp. at 1510 ("Plaintiffs do not give up
their substantive rights under federal laws by being required to arbitrate their
dispute."); Colangelo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,365, at 92,330 (M.D. Fla. July 23, 1985)
(finding that the state of the law at the time Rule 15c2-2 was promulgated was
no longer the current state of the law).
334. See, e.g., Scharp v. Cralin & Co., 617 F. Supp. 476, 479 (D. Fla. 1985)
(arbitration clause read in part: "This provision is not intended to waive any
rights which the undersigned [customer] may have to elect to take legal action
as to any matter or claim arising under the Federal Securities Laws."); Shotto,
632 F. Supp. at 519 (similar provision).
335. See, e.g., Scharp, 617 F. Supp. at 479-80 (holding that plaintiff did not
waive right to sue by signing agreement to arbitrate); Hammerman v. Peacock,
[1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 92,239, at 91,704-05
(D.D.C. July 31, 1985) (finding that the agreement clause stating the customer
had a right to judicial recourse for federal securities law claims indicated an
intent not to submit any valid claim under the federal securities laws to arbi-
tration). But see Shotto, 632 F. Supp. at 526-27 (stating that although agree-
ment contained a clause limiting arbitration, 1934 Act claims should be
arbitrated in light of Byrd and its progeny).
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ble. The solution to this conundrum is to repeal the rule or to
modify it to require notice only that express causes of action
under the 1934 Act cannot be compulsorily arbitrated.
IV. WHY NOT ARBITRATE SECURITIES DISPUTES?
This Article has attempted to sort through the morass of
existing law concerning the enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments in the securities industry. This final Part examines the
larger question that arises: Is arbitration a good and fair way to
resolve differences between brokers and their customers?336
The historical objections to arbitrating such claims are based on
myths of two types: myths about the arbitration agreements
entered into between brokers and customers and myths about
the arbitration proceedings themselves. Once these myths are
refuted, no objection remains to compelling arbitration if the
parties have validly agreed to arbitrate.
A. DISPELLING THE MYTHS ABOUT ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS
1. Myth #1: Arbitration Clauses are Adhesion Contracts
That Customers Must Sign if They Want Access to
the Securities Markets.
An adhesion contract is generally more of an ultimatum
than an agreement. A contract is considered to be an adhesion
contract when a provision, usually in a standard form contract
drafted by a party in a position to dictate terms, is presented to
a second party who has no choice but to accept it. 337 The fact
that an arbitration clause is contained in an adhesion contract
does not necessarily render it unenforceable, 338 but it may
make enforcement difficult as a practical matter.339
Courts and commentators simply assume, however, with-
out empirical evidence, that arbitration clauses are presented to
336. The topic of the propriety of arbitration of claims between brokers is
not discussed in this section; most people would agree that there is nothing
wrong with compelling brokers to arbitrate their disputes if they have so
agreed.
337. See Katsoris, supra note 9, at 306.
338. See id. at 306-07; see also Vernon v. Drexel Burnham & Co., 52 Cal.
App. 3d 706, 713, 125 Cal. Rptr. 147, 151 (1975) (rejecting customer's argument
that broker's arbitration clause was unenforceable as an adhesion contract).
339. See Wright, Arbitration Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, ARB. J., June
1978, at 41, 42 (court faces dilemma of deferring to public policy favoring arbi-
tration or to interest in ensuring voluntary agreements).
1987]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
investors on a take-it-or-leave-it basis340 and that brokers uni-
formly force such clauses on their customers. 341 These critics
then suggest that the inequality of bargaining power between
the parties makes the waiver of judicial remedies suspect.342
The most obvious problem with such reasoning is that it
proves too much. As stated, the argument would work to inval-
idate all arbitration clauses in contracts between persons of dis-
parate bargaining power.343 The second problem is that the
FAA is designed to guard against such suspect waivers of judi-
cial remedies. No arbitration clause may be enforced if general
principles of contract law suggest it should not be enforced.344
Contract law provides circumstances under which adhesion
contracts will not be enforced.345 Arbitration clauses are no dif-
ferent from any other contractual provision. If a party feels it
is unfair to hold him to the agreement to arbitrate, an argu-
ment based on general contract law would be called for.346
340. In Wilko, Justice Frankfurter criticized the majority on this basis,
noting that there was nothing in the record to suggest that the customers had
no choice but to sign the agreement containing the arbitration clause. See
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 440 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
341. See, e.g., H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 390-91 (1963); Ex-
change Act Release No. 15,984 [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
T 82,122, at 81,976 (July 2, 1979) (stating that broker-dealers require customers
to enter agreements containing arbitration clauses prior to opening an
account).
342. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 95, at 518 ("The public policy involved
when one party is in a position to impose an arbitration clause on the other is
a basic one: No one should be deprived of access to the courts unless that
party has satisfactorily demonstrated a willingness to give up such access.").
343. This problem was recognized by Professor Stewart E. Sterk, but he at-
tempts to justify it by noting that "securities agreements as a class tend to in-
volve" inequality of bargaining power, whatever that means. See id. at 517.
344. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
345. See Katsoris, supra note 9, at 306-07 (stating that courts will not en-
force adhesion contracts that are not within the weaker party's reasonable ex-
pectations or are unduly oppresive).
346. One contract argument frequently tried but rarely successful is that
the agreement was secured by the broker through fraud in the inducement.
Courts generally hold, however, that fraud in the inducement of the agree-
ment as a whole can be determined by the arbitrator. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Haydu, 637 F.2d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 1981). Only
fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself will suffice to avoid ar-
bitration. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,
403-04 (1967); Miller v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,783, at 93,858 (11th Cir. June 17, 1986);
Jarvis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 (D. Vt. 1985). The
corollary holding in cases where exchange members sue other exchange mem-
bers is that if the member was induced to join the exchange fraudulently, the
arbitration agreement contained in the exchange rules is ineffective. See
Laupheimer v. McDonnell & Co., 500 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that
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Moreover, not all brokers require customers to sign arbi-
tration agreements as a condition to access to the market. Evi-
dence suggests that this myth has never been true. A study
conducted in 1953, the year Wilko was decided, surveyed
twenty margin agreements in use then and found that a signifi-
cant proportion of them did not contain arbitration clauses.3
47
It remains true today that a customer need not sign an arbitra-
tion agreement to trade in securities. A survey of four of the
largest national brokerage houses shows that only two require
any agreement at all before a person begins trading in the mar-
kets.348 Only one of the four uses an arbitration clause for cash
customers.349 All four firms require written agreements for
margin and options transactions, but only two of them use arbi-
tration clauses in connection with their agreements.350
Although the sample included in this survey was small, the
findings suggest clearly that a customer has a choice; she need
not sign an arbitration agreement to trade in the stock, bond, or
even the options markets.35 1L The customer has a choice be-
tween a full service broker and a discount broker who do not
use arbitration clauses. Furthermore, nothing suggests that, in
the plaintiff, as a member and as a stockholder, is entitled not to arbitrate). If
a plaintiff alleges fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself,
there will be an adjudication of that allegation before a decision is made
whether the claim should be sent to arbitration. See Wick v. Atlantic Marine,
Inc., 605 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1979).
347. See Note, supra note 203, at 987 n.1. That survey did not report the
incidence of arbitration clauses for strictly cash customers. A cash customer is
obligated to pay for her securities in full on or before the "settlement date,"
which is usually five days from the date of purchase. A person with a margin
account need only pay a percentage of the purchase price by the settlement
date; the rest is lent to her by the broker. Because of this "leverage," the risk
of loss is substantially greater for a person making full use of available margin.
Thus, margin accounts are for the more sophisticated investor.
348. Charles S. Schwab & Co., the nation's largest discount brokerage firm,
requires a written agreement signed by the customer, as does Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith. E.F. Hutton & Co., and A.G. Edwards & Sons, how-
ever, do not.
349. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith uses an arbitration clause,
Charles Schwab & Co. does not.
350. The options and margin agreements of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith and A.G. Edwards & Sons contain arbitration clauses; similar agree-
ments used by Charles Schwab & Co. and E.F. Hutton & Co. do not.
351. Professor Constantine N. Katsoris, as a result of his own informal sur-
vey, came to the same conclusion. He found that, generally, a customer must
sign an agreement before opening a margin, options, or commodity account,
but that written agreements in cash accounts are much less prevalent. See
Katsoris, supra note 9, at 292 n.86. Professor Katsoris does not report what
percentage of the written agreements contained arbitration clauses.
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an industry as competitive as the brokerage business, a firm
would reject a customer's account if the customer insisted on
deleting the arbitration clause.
In short, arbitration clauses are not adhesion contracts. If a
customer wants to trade in the markets without waiving his
right to sue in court, he can do so. If that customer enters into
an agreement to arbitrate disputes, that is a choice he has made
freely.352
2. Myth #2: Arbitration Clauses Used by Brokers Force
Customers to Arbitrate on the Broker's Home
Court.
Critics of enforcing arbitration clauses often contend that
in arbitrations conducted pursuant to a broker's arbitration
clause, the arbitrators are affiliated with the securities industry
and, therefore, less likely to give the customer a fair hearing.35 3
One commentator has suggested that investors are "under-
standably suspicious" because arbitrators are "heavily oriented
toward the [securities] industry."3M These commentators are
mistaken about the arbitration panels for which brokers' agree-
ments customarily provide.
Nearly all arbitration agreements used by brokerage firms
give the investor a choice among various arbitration panels.
The industry standard reads as follows:
Any controversy between you [the broker] and the undersigned [cus-
tomer] arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach thereof,
shall be settled by arbitration, in accordance with the rules, then ob-
taining, of either the Arbitration Committee of the Chamber of Com-
merce of the State of New York, or the American Arbitration
Association, or the Board of Arbitration of the New York Stock Ex-
change, as the undersigned [customer] may elect.3 5 5
352. If the customer neglects to read the agreement, that should not be a
defense to a motion to compel arbitration. See, e.g., Hicks v. Ocean Drilling &
Exploration Co., 512 F.2d 817, 825-26 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding that a party who
signs without reading an agreement cannot use ignorance as a defense), cert
denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
353. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 13,470, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,136, at 87,906 (Apr. 26, 1977).
354. See Comment, supra note 203, at 123. See also id at 129 ("The institu-
tional framework of securities industry arbitration ... [results in] a substantial
denial of the rights and protections granted investors by the antifraud
provisions.").
355. Id. at 125 (quoting 8 C. NICHOLS, CYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL FORMS ANNO-
TATED § 8.1710, at 921 (1973) as the most widely used arbitration clause).
Clauses substantially identical to the Nichols form are widely used. See. e.g.,
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 n.15 (1953); Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., 491
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The customer therefore has the choice of three different arbi-
tration panels, only one of which is a member of the securities
industry. The other two are independent, nonprofit organiza-
tions with no ties to the securities industry at all. Moreover, an
arbitration under the auspices of the New York Stock Ex-
change must be conducted by a group of arbitrators, the major-
ity of whom must be from outside the securities industry if the
customer so elects.
35 6
The modern trend is to give the investor even more choice.
Recent cases show that investors are generally asked to choose
between the American Arbitration Association and one of a
number of industry organizations that have arbitration depart-
ments.357 In each of those industry organizations, the arbitra-
tion rules provide that the customer may elect to have her case
decided by an arbitration panel consisting of a majority of arbi-
trators from outside the securities industry.358 Although some
arbitration clauses provide the customer with a shorter list
from which to choose,359 apparently all arbitration clauses now
F.2d 1176, 1178 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974); Wise v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 596 F. Supp.
1391, 1396 (D. Del. 1984); Seymour v. Bache & Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,402, at 99,056 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1976);
Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21, 24 (E.D. Cal. 1974);
Berens v. Bache & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,387, at 95,337 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 1974); Shearson, Hammill & Co. v. Vouis,
247 So. 2d 733, 734 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 253 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1971).
Although the contract purports to be between the customer and the brokerage
firm, the customer cannot avoid arbitration simply by suing the individual bro-
ker instead; the arbitration clause applies to the individual broker on a theory
of agency. See Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1003, 119
Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (1975).
356. See infra notes 375-76 and accompanying text.
357. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Illinois Co., 635 F. Supp. 615, 617 n.1 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (customer given choice between AAA or any stock, option, or commodity
exchange of which defendant was a member); Shotto v. Laub, 632 F. Supp. 516,
519 (D. Md. 1986) (customer given choice between AAA, New York Stock Ex-
change, American Stock Exchange or Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers); Cunning-
ham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 579 (E.D. Cal. 1982)
(customer given choice between AAA, New York Stock Exchange, American
Stock Exchange, Chicago Board Options Exchange or Nat'l Ass'n of Sec.
Dealers).
358. As noted infra notes 375-76 and accompanying text, all the industry
organizations from which the customer may choose have adopted the Uniform
Code of Arbitration, which ensures that an investor may opt for a panel made
up of a majority from outside the securities industry.
359. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d
823, 824 (10th Cir. 1978) (customer given choice between New York Stock Ex-
change, American Stock Exchange, and Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers); Weiss-
buch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 833 (7th Cir.
1977) (same).
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allow the customer to choose an arbitration panel that consists
of a majority from outside the industry.360 It simply is not true
that arbitration clauses are designed to ensure that the broker
always has the home team advantage.
B. DISPELLING THE MYTHS ABOUT ARBITRATION PROCEDURES
Under the rules of all the major exchanges,361 a customer
can insist that disputes with his broker be arbitrated, whether
there is an agreement to that effect or not; the exchanges insist
that their members arbitrate if the customer wants to arbi-
trate.362 Thus, a compulsory arbitration clause between a cus-
tomer and a broker that is applicable to both parties favors the
broker by making the right to insist on arbitration reciprocal. 363
Most customers and their lawyers therefore are suspicious
about arbitrating disputes; they question why the brokers want
arbitration if it does not give them an advantage. The answer
must be that the brokers are attempting to save on the cost of
litigation, which benefits both parties. This is the only reason-
able explanation, because the idea that arbitration procedures
unfairly benefit the broker is pure myth.
360. Each industry organization referred to supra note 359 has arbitration
rules that so provide. See infra notes 375-76 and accompanying text.
361. Since 1980, the arbitration rules of the major exchanges and other
SROs have been uniform. In 1979 and 1980, 10 major SROs adopted the Uni-
form Code of Arbitration: the New York Stock Exchange, the American
Stock Exchange, the Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, the Pacific Stock Exchange,
the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, the Cincinnati Stock Exchange,
the Midwest Stock Exchange, the Boston Stock Exchange, the Chicago Board
Options Exchange, and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange. See Katsoris, supra
note 9, at 284 & n.24. For a discussion of the history of the development of the
Uniform Code of Arbitration, see id. at 283-84.
362. See UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION Rule 600(a) (as adopted by the
New York Stock Exchange, reprinted in Arbitration Rules, Dep't of Arbitra-
tion, New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 11 Wall St., New York 10005) [hereinaf-
ter UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION]; see also Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, Victor
& Neufeld, 451 F.2d 838, 841-43 (2d Cir. 1971) (stating that a member of New
York Stock Exchange must abide by the Exchange's arbitration rule); Finan-
cial House, Inc. v. Otten, 369 F. Supp. 105, 107-08 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (member of
Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers must arbitrate according to the rules of the Ass'n).
363. See Note, supra note 203, at 996-97. Courts have not been troubled
that the exchange rules require brokers to waive their right to sue in federal
court even for express claims under the 1933 Act, because it is generally as-
sumed that the securities acts were not designed to protect brokers. See, e.g.,
Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1213-14 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 949 (1972); Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766, 771-72
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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1. Myth #1: Customers are Unlikely to Win in Arbitration
Because the Procedures are Fundamentally Unfair
to Them.
Both courts364 and commentators365 have objected to arbi-
tration on the ground that arbitration procedures favor brokers.
The objection is not a valid one today for three reasons. First,
as already noted, nearly all arbitration clauses permit the cus-
tomer to choose to arbitrate before the American Arbitration
Association.366 The Association is an independent, nonprofit or-
ganization with approximately 60,000 arbitrators throughout
the United States and twenty six branch offices in the major
American cities, 36 7 so the parties need not travel long distances
to conduct the arbitration hearings. The rules of the American
Arbitration Association contain a number of procedural safe-
guards for the disputants: the arbitrators must be neutral,
368
the parties decide on the locale of the hearing,3 69 the parties
choose the arbitrators, 370 either party may be represented by
counsel,371 and both parties may call witnesses and introduce
documentary evidence.3 7 2 In addition, the parties may conduct
limited discovery373 and can have a complete record made of
the proceedings.3 7 4 It is difficult to see how such rules could
work to the unfair advantage of brokers.
Second, there is a high degree of solicitousness toward the
customer even for arbitrations conducted before industry-spon-
sored panels. Contrary to the widely-held belief that arbitra-
tors for the exchanges are biased in favor of brokers, 375 the
Uniform Code of Arbitration, which has been adopted by all
the major exchanges, provides that an investor may demand an
364. E.g., Richards v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 64 Cal.
App. 3d 899, 135 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1976) (holding that arbitration agreement re-
quiring customer to arbitrate under rules of New York Stock Exchange was
unenforceable, since those rules were fundamentally unfair).
365. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 203, at 123.
366. See supra notes 355-60 and accompanying text.
367. See Meyerowitz, supra note 7, at 79.
368. AAA Commercial Arbitration Rule 12, reprinted in R. COUISON,
BUSINEss ARBITRATION - WHAT You NEED To KNow 86 (2d ed. 1982).
369. Id. (Rule 11).
370. Id. at 87 (Rules 13, 14).
371. Id. at 88 (Rule 22).
372. Id. at 90 (Rule 31).
373. Id. The issue of discovery in arbitration is discussed in more detail in-
fra notes 387-98 and accompanying text.
374. AAA Commercial Arbitration Rule 23, reprinted in R. COULSON,
supra note 368, at 88.
375. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 203, at 123.
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arbitration panel made up of a majority from outside the secur-
ities industry.3 7 6 The. parties are each given one peremptory
challenge and unlimited challenges for cause of the arbitrators
selected.3 7 7 Any potential biases must be disclosed by the arbi-
trators378 and, before challenges are made, each party is in-
formed of the business affiliations of the arbitrators.3 7 9 Third,
customers are protected by the rules set forth in the Uniform
Code of Arbitration which, like the rules of the American Arbi-
tration Association, allows the parties to be represented by
counsel,3 0 to conduct limited discovery,38 ' and to request a
complete record of the proceedings.38 2 Since its adoption in
1979 and 1980, the Uniform Code of Arbitration has received
the imprimatur of the courts38 3 and the tacit approval of the
SEC.38 4
The most important indicator that arbitration before the
exchanges is a fair mechanism for customers is that customers
win their disputes in those arbitration proceedings. Customers
won exactly half of the 410 broker-customer disputes adjudi-
cated by arbitration before SROs in 1980.385 That trend contin-
ued in succeeding years, with customers winning approximately
376. See UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 362, Rule 607(a).
377. See id Rule 609.
378. See id Rule 610.
379. See id Rule 608.
380. See id. Rule 614.
381. See id Rule 619, 620.
382. See id. Rule 624.
383. See Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1361
(11th Cir. 1985) (stating that Code rules adequately protect rights of custom-
ers); Brener v. Becker Paribas Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442, 448-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(rejecting argument that Code rules do not adequately protect the rights of
investors).
384. Under § 19(c) of the 1934 Act, the SEC has the power to amend, add
to, delete from, or abrogate any rules of any of the exchanges if it perceives
the possibility of abuse or unfairness in exchange procedures. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78s (1982). Thus, if the SEC perceived unfairness in the exchanges' arbitra-
tion rules, it could void them or change them as it wished. This has led one
court to the conclusion that the Code rules are fair to investors. See Brener,
628 F. Supp. at 448-49. The SEC now agrees. It recently argued that when ar-
bitration is subject to SEC oversight, as it is when conducted between an inves-
tor and a registered broker-dealer, the investor is sufficiently protected and
arbitration agreements should be enforced. SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 21,
at 13. In addition, the SEC has stated its belief that arbitration is an economi-
cal and efficient means of resolving disputes between customers and their bro-
kers. See Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 82,122, at 81,975 (July 2, 1979).
385. See Katsoris, supra note 9, at 280 n.7.
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51.5 percent of the cases over a four year period.3 86
2. Myth #2: The Lack of Full Discovery in Arbitration
Works to the Disadvantage of Investors.
Commentators have noted the lack of discovery in arbitra-
tion and have suggested that that puts investors at a disadvan-
tage before arbitration panels.3 8 7  On close examination,
however, this objection is without merit.
First, discovery is available in arbitration proceedings; it is
just more limited than in full-blown litigation.3 88 The FAA em-
powers arbitrators to subpoena documents and persons,38 9
which in practical terms means the parties have the subpoena
power subject to the arbitrator's control of abuses.390 In addi-
tion, the rules of both the Uniform Code of Arbitration391 and
the American Arbitration Association3 92 provide for subpoenas
to be issued at the request of either party or their attorneys.
Furthermore, a court that has stayed judicial proceedings pend-
ig arbitration can order discovery if necessary to a party's case,
and the discovery will not delay the arbitration proceeding.393
Thus, the only discovery the arbitration rules do not allow is
abusive discovery or discovery conducted as a fishing expedition
for a claimant who does not yet have a case when she files.
These discovery limitations work to the benefit of both parties.
A large brokerage firm cannot wear down an investor with ex-
pensive and time-consuming discovery requests, and the inves-
tor cannot harrass the broker with a strike suit to compel
settlement.
In addition, investors are not disadvantaged by limited dis-
covery because it is largely unnecessary under the arbitration
386. In 1981, customers won 264 of 532 cases; in 1982, customers won 293 of
558 cases; and in 1983, customers won 331 of 622 cases. See id.
387. See, e.g., Neville, supra note 234, at 7 (noting that lack of discovery is
used as an argument against enforcing arbitration agreements).
388. See Katsoris, supra note 9, at 287 & n.52, and sources cited therein.
389. See 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1982).
390. See, e.g., Local Lodge 1746, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Pratt &
Whitney Div., 329 F. Supp. 283, 284 (D. Conn. 1971) (illustrating the way in
which subpoena procedure under FAA works: parties submit requests for sub-
poenas to arbitrator and arbitrator signs the subpoenas). There is nothing to
suggest that reasonable requests for discovery are ever denied by arbitrators.
391. See UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 362, Rule 619.
392. See AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, reprinted in R. COULSON,
supra note 368, at 85-94.
393. See Note, Arbitration and Award-Discovery-Court May Permit Dis-
covery on the Merits When It Will Not Delay Arbitration, 44 U. CIN. L. REV.
151 (1975).
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rules used by the securities exchanges. A claimant must, in the
initial statement of a claim, set out all the facts on which he in-
tends to rely.394 The answering party must then set out all the
facts on which she will rely at the hearing and set forth all de-
fenses that will be asserted.395 Any facts, claims, or defenses
left out of either pleading may not be used at the hearing it-
self.396 After the pleadings have been filed, the rules require
the parties to cooperate in the exchange of documents and in-
formation.397 Thus, at least with respect to arbitrations before
the major securities exchanges, formal discovery has become
largely unnecessary.
Finally, to argue against arbitrating securities disputes be-
cause of the lack of formal discovery would be to argue against
arbitrating any disputes because all arbitration proceedings, not
just those for securities disputes, lack formal discovery proce-
dures. The lack of the expensive elements of litigation is what
makes arbitration so attractive. As Judge Learned Hand noted
more than forty years ago, efficient and inexpensive arbitration
is inconsistent with all the accoutrements of litigation.398
3. Myth #3: The Lack of Judicial Instruction on the Law
Prejudices Customers in Arbitration Proceedings.
Some courts and commentators have suggested that, in ar-
bitration, the trier of fact's lack of judicial instruction works to
the detriment of investors or otherwise diminishes the effec-
tiveness of the arbitration alternative.39 9 That critique, like
most, is one that is universally applicable: if it were a reason
for not arbitrating securities disputes, it would be a reason for
not arbitrating any legal disputes. Furthermore, as several ob-
servers have aptly noted, the parties are entitled to brief the ar-
bitrators on the law and to make opening and closing
arguments.40 0 The arbitrators, therefore, do not go without in-
394. See UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 362, Rule 612.
395. See id.
396. See id.
397. See id. Rule 619.
398. American Almond Prods. Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144
F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir. 1944) (L. Hand, J.).
399. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953); Neville, supra note
234, at 7; cf Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (stating lack
of judicial instruction as one reason the result in an arbitration may differ
from the result in a judicial setting).
400. See Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1361
(11th Cir. 1985); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1215 (2d Cir.
1972); Neville, supra note 234, at 7.
[Vol. 71:393
SECURITIES ARBITRATION
struction on the law. Moreover, many arbitrators themselves
are retired judges and lawyers. 401
Even if the arbitrators were not as fully and impartially ap-
prised of the law as a jury would be, that shortcoming is party-
neutral; there is no reason to believe it works to the advantage
or disadvantage of either customers or brokers.
4. Myth #4: The Lack of Judicial Review Available for
Arbitral Awards Puts the Investor at an Unfair
Disadvantage.
Critics of arbitrating securities disputes often bemoan the
lack of judicial review available for arbitrators' decisions, some-
times claiming that the lack of review results in a substantial
diminution in investor protection.40 2 The critics are at least
half right: judicial review is limited if a party is unsatisfied
with an arbitration award. Nevertheless, that limitation on ju-
dicial review does not work to the disadvantage of the investor.
Because binding arbitration is inconsistent with complete
judicial review, 40 3 courts may not review the factual and legal
issues that were decided by the arbitration panel.40 4 Rather,
the judicial role is confined to correcting extraordinary abuses
of power.40 5 That is not to say that arbitrators are not obligated
to follow the law. On the contrary, in a securities dispute, arbi-
trators must decide the matter in accordance with the securities
laws, not just on some notion of fairness.40 6
Although there have been some suggestions that an arbi-
trator's misreading of or failure to follow applicable law would
be grounds for overturning the award, 40 7 it seems clear that the
requisite abuse of power by the arbitrator to warrant overturn-
401. See Neville, supra 234, at 10.
402. Id
403. See R. COULSON, supra note 368, at 25 (arbitration cannot result in
quick resolution if judicial review is permitted).
404. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Local 8-766, Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l
Union, 600 F.2d 322, 326 (1st Cir. 1979) (allowing judicial review only when the
arbitrators have exceeded their jurisdictional powers).
405. See id
406. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 433-34, 435 (1953); see also Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3355 (1985)
(stating that by submitting to arbitration, parties do not give up substantive
legal rights). But see Comment, supra note 203, at 123 (suggesting that the ar-
bitrator's duty to follow substantive law is vague).
407. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 440 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting); In re Revenue Properties Litig. Cases, 451 F.2d 310, 314 (1st Cir.
1971).
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ing an award is much more than a simple error of law. Section
10 of the FAA lists four grounds on which an arbitration award
may be vacated: if the award was procured by "corruption,
fraud, or undue means";40 if the arbitrators were guilty of "evi-
dent partiality or corruption";40 9 if the arbitrators were guilty
of misconduct that prejudiced a party;410 or if the arbitrators
exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a
final and definite award was not made.4 11 The Supreme Court
has interpreted section 10 to include cases in which the arbitra-
tors exhibited a "manifest disregard" of the law, apparently be-
cause such disregard constitutes misconduct on the part of the
arbitrators given their duty to follow the law.412 Courts now
recognize that the grounds for overturning an arbitration
award are limited to the four express grounds provided in the
FAA and the "manifest disregard" standard implied by the
Supreme Court.413
Not surprisingly, arbitration review cases tend to focus on
the question of manifest disregard of the applicable law. Courts
will not vacate an arbitral award for mistakes of law made by
the arbitrators unless, as a general rule, there is some indica-
tion that the arbitrators knew what the applicable law was and
simply ignored it or refused to apply it. 414 Because arbitrators
408. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1982).
409. Id. § 10(b).
410. See id. § 10(c).
411. See id. § 10(d).
412. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37 (distinguishing faulty interpretations of
the law from manifest disregard). Lower courts have followed the Supreme
Court's lead by recognizing manifest disregard of the law as a grounds for
overturning an arbitral award. See, e.g., San Martine Compania De Navega-
cion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals, Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961);
Fairchild & Co. v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R., 516 F. Supp.
1305, 1315 (D.D.C. 1981).
413. See, e.g., Peters Fabrics, Inc. v. Jantzen, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1287, 1292
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying 9 U.S.C. § 10(c) when stating the grounds on which
an arbitration award can be vacated).
414. See Local No. P-1236, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jones Dairy
Farm, 680 F.2d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that a court lacks authority
to overturn an arbitration award unless arbitrator showed a manifest disregard
for the law); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972)
(arbitrators must have ignored the applicable law); San Martine Compania De
Navegacion, S.A., 293 F.2d at 801 (manifest disregard may exist where the arbi-
trators understood and correctly stated the law but disregarded it nonethe-
less); Fairchild & Co., 516 F. Supp. at 1315 (arbitrators must have correctly
stated the law and disregarded it); Sidarma Societa Italiana Di Armamento
Spa, Venice v. Holt Marine Indus., 515 F. Supp. 1302, 1308-09 (S.D.N.Y.) (arbi-
trators must have deliberately disregarded what they knew to be the law),
affd, 681 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1981); Fukaya Trading Co. v. Eastern Marine Corp.,
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are not required to give reasons for their decisions415 and, in-
deed, are discouraged from doing so, 4 1 6 some commentators
question how a dissatisfied arbitrant can challenge the award
on the basis of a manifest disregard of the law.
417
The answer is that a court will be able to discern obvious,
grotesque disregard of the law, because the record will include
the parties' detailed submissions to the arbitrators, including
memoranda of law,4 18 together with all the documents involved
in the case and a transcript of the hearing if the parties so de-
sire.419 Thus, if the parties' memoranda and remarks before
the arbitrators indicate agreement on a point of law, and the
award is patently inconsistent with that law, a court must infer
that the arbitrator was aware of the law and disregarded it.
Similarly, if the arbitrator's remarks in the transcript indicate a
determination to disregard the applicable law, the court would
be forced to overturn the award. Even if some mistakes of law
cannot be corrected, however, that is not necessarily a disad-
vantage for the investor. The entire judicial review process is
party-neutral in that it does not favor one side or the other.
Either party can be victimized by an arbitrator's error of law,
just as either party can be victimized by a court's or jury's error
of law.
Perhaps most important, however, is that certain limita-
tions, such as the possibility that an arbitration panel will mis-
apply the law without being corrected, are inherent in the
nature of arbitration. The problem of judicial review cannot be
used to argue against arbitrating securities claims, because to do
so would be to argue against arbitrating any claims the parties
have agreed to arbitrate.420 Congress decided that matter of
322 F. Supp. 278, 282 (E.D. La. 1971) (holding that an arbitration award will be
vacated only if the award was made in manifest disregard of the law). But see
In re Revenue Properties Litig. Cases, 451 F.2d 310, 314 (1st Cir. 1971) (stating
that "any manifest misreading of securities legislation can be effectively chal-
lenged in court").
415. See Sobel, 469 F.2d at 1214.
416. See R. COULSON, supra note 368, at 25 (AAA does not encourage writ-
ten opinions by arbitrators).
417. Some courts have noted this conundrum as a shortcoming of arbitra-
tion. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953); Sobel, 469 F.2d at
1214.
418. See Sobe4 469 F.2d at 1215.
419. See, e.g., Greenblatt v. Drexel Burniham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352,
1361 (11th Cir. 1985).
420. See, e.g., In re Revenue Properties Litig. Cases, 451 F.2d 310, 313-14
(1st Cir. 1971) (stating that arbitration cannot be insulated from important is-
sues of substantive law); Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1966) (stat-
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policy in 1925 when it enacted the FAA: Arbitration clauses
are to be enforced because arbitration is a good thing.
CONCLUSION
Privatization of disputes through arbitration is a good
thing, particularly for securities disputes. Its advantages accrue
equally to both investors and brokers. The parties have an op-
portunity to avoid crowded court dockets in favor of a resolu-
tion procedure whose average total time is from four to six
months.421 Reduced resolution times can be particularly advan-
tageous to plaintiffs with valid claims because they will receive
payment sooner. The time element benefits both parties by en-
suring that evidence will be fresh.
Arbitration is also considerably cheaper than litigation-
about one-third the cost, even taking into consideration that
both parties may be represented by counsel.422 Therefore,
smaller claims that an investor could not assert in court due to
the expense of litigation may be vindicated in arbitration. In
fact, both the American Arbitration Association and the Uni-
form Code of Arbitration provide streamlined procedures for
small claims.4 23
The parties are not the only beneficiaries of privatization.
Arbitration promotes important societal interests as well. Be-
cause of the crowded court dockets, for every claim that is liti-
gated, another is left waiting. Thus, to the extent more cases go
to arbitration, more claimants who may not have agreed to ar-
bitrate their claims will have access to the federal courts. In
addition, the unnecessary litigation of cases in federal court car-
ries with it enormous dollar costs for society as a whole. The
country's resources are better spent elsewhere.
Arbitration cannot possibly retain its advantages and have
all the niceties a judicial hearing entails, but that is something
for the parties to consider before they enter into arbitration
agreements.424 With respect to securities agreements, all the
ing that it is unavoidable that arbitration will frequently decide difficult issues
of law); Sterk, supra note 95, at 516-17 (stating that there is no persuasive rea-
son for treating securities law cases differently than other cases with respect
to the possibility of error of law in arbitration).
421. See Meyerowitz, supra note 7, at 80.
422. See id.
423. See AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules 54-58, reprinted in R. COUL-
SON, supra note 368, at 93-94; UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 362,
Rule 601.
424. See American Almond Prods. Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144
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evidence indicates that at the time the agreement is signed, cus-
tomers have a choice as to whether they want to arbitrate fu-
ture disputes with their broker.
425
With those thoughts in mind, the courts and Congress can
promote the privatization of securities disputes in a number of
ways. The decision in Wilko v. Swan 426 should be overturned
by the Supreme Court or by Congress. The case was wrongly
decided as a matter of statutory interpretation, and its holding
is bad policy. The SEC now also argues for its demise. 427 No
valid reasons justify barring investors from agreeing to arbi-
trate future disputes that arise under the express liability pro-
visions of the 1933 Act. To the extent that parties seeking to
avoid their contractual obligations to arbitrate entered into the
agreements knowingly and willingly, the courts should have no
sympathy for them; to the extent those parties' agreements
were not willful and knowing, the parties' recourse should be
to principles of contract law as contemplated by the FAA.
4 28
If Wilko is not overturned, courts should adopt the sophis-
ticated investor exception more widely.42 9 The government en-
acted the securities laws for the benefit of people who could not
look out for themselves.430 The government should not provide
an escape hatch from contracts for parties who need no assist-
ance from the government. In addition, the Wilko doctrine
should not be extended to claims that arise under the 1934 Act
or to claims under implied causes of action generally. Even as-
suming Wilko was rightly decided, there is no analytical reason
for applying its holding to these other types of claims. 431 Any
further limitation on the enforcement of valid arbitration
clauses is just plain bad policy.
Finally, as Lord Hewart wrote more than sixty years ago,
F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir. 1944) (L. Hand, J.) (stating that when parties adopt arbi-
tration, "they must be content with its informalities; they may not hedge it
about with those procedural limitations which it is precisely its purpose to
avoid").
425. See supra notes 337-52 and accompanying text.
426. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
427. See SEC Arnicus Brief, supra note 21, at 13 ("The view of arbitration
on which Wilko rested is today inappropriate in cases involving disputes be-
tween registered broker-dealers and their customers.").
428. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
429. See supra notes 234-53 and accompanying text.
430. See, e.g., Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1213-14 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972); Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F.
Supp. 766, 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
431. See supra notes 273-313 and accompanying text.
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"[i]t is not of some importance but is of fundamental impor-
tance that justice should not only be done, but should mani-
festly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. '432 This Article has
demonstrated that in arbitration justice is done, or at least that
its possibility is procedurally maximized. Securities regulation
is concerned with investor confidence,433 however, and no sys-
tem of dispute resolution is acceptable if it is not perceived to
be fair. The securities industry should therefore remedy, with
aggressive public relations work, the disparity between the per-
ception of fairness and the fact of fairness in the arbitration of
securities disputes. With its enhanced image, privatization may
then gain the good reputation it deserves.
432. King v. Sussex Justices, [1924] 1 K.B. 256, 259.
433. See Sterk, supra note 95, at 519.
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